The Enclavism Book: Chapter 3 – “The Cycle of Collapse”

Enclavism: The Cycle of Collapse

Previous Piece: The Enclavism Book: Chapter 2 – “The Legacy Options by Power Source”

The Cycle of Collapse

Section 1: The Original Theories of Anacyclosis

As we demonstrated in the last chapter, all government frameworks have some positive and negative elements. This is why most of us can relate to the proponents of nearly any form. Given personal desires and the current conditions of a nation, certain political leanings can make perfect sense. It’s also why we witness political leanings evolving over time, given the changing internal conditions of any nation. A late-stage republic will create a lot more radicals than the early stage alternative.

Yet, we’ve also seen that none of these frameworks are sustainable in their current form. They all have certain negative attributes that lead to their degeneration and decline. No legacy system has the possibility of surviving the political cycle of change. None were considered sustainable. They will all collapse given enough time.

Which brings us to the point of Enclavism. Which is breaking this political cycle of collapse. Or, as the ancient Greeks called it, anacyclosis.

Understanding the cycle is simple. Over time, the governmental framework decays. It then changes or collapses into a different framework regime. Then, eventually, that new regime also degrades. We constantly loop in and out of these government cycles, experiencing continual rebirth and subsequent death.

Let’s discuss a specific example. We begin with a representative style of government. Our representative system of government degrades, resulting in a socialistic system with an oligarchical ruling class. This is a rule-by-many degrading into a rule-by-few. Eventually, financial strife causes problems in our oligarchy leading toward an ideologue who threatens the ruling few. He wins through mob violence. Thus, we trade a rule-by-few into a rule-by-one. This rule-by-one form inevitably degenerates because our ruler’s children are not as benevolent as the first ideologue, so the people overthrow him. Our rule-by-one vanishes and a rule-by-many returns. Then the cycle continues indefinitely. This cycle of political regime change has been repeated since time began. Nothing has been able to stop it.

Sometimes the changes and decline are rapid. Sometimes certain forms are able to hold on for longer than others. But the result is always the same. We are constantly trapped in this cycle of continually changing regimes.

Plato spoke of this with his theory of Five Regimes and Kyklos.[i] Classical Greek author Polybius provides arguably our most helpful analysis that becomes the bedrock of future study. He called it anacyclosis.[ii] Aristotle also wrote extensively on this subject.[iii] Renaissance authors such as Machiavelli spoke of the political shifts of anacyclosis.[iv] Plenty of others, such as Sir John Glubb and authors of the Enlightenment, have documented their experience with this effect.[v]

To develop a modernized version, we must first fully understand their findings. We will focus most of our time on Polybius: he created the most fleshed out version that most modern authors expanded upon. Firstly, however, we will mention Plato’s theory.

We start with Plato and his Kyklos theory. Plato noticed five regimes that contribute to the cycle. These are aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. They degrade in that order. Aristocracy is where a small ruling caste led by a philosopher king grounds the country in wisdom and reason. This type of government eventually became untenable due to miscalculations over time by the absolute rulers. Timocracy is a representative style government where inferior individuals are allowed involvement in governance. It is the inevitable future of aristocracy. Plato believed this political government was what caused the eventual degradation of culture and constitution. With that degradation comes opportunists looking to gain at the expense of the nation. So naturally, following timocracy, we have oligarchy, which we previously discussed in-depth. This form of oligarchy led to further centralization and corrupt leadership due to the inferior, greedy leaders. After oligarchy, Plato believed in the switch to democracy but a specific form of it. Plato spoke of democracy in terms of the man who does not resist lustful ventures, such as a lifelong purpose geared toward gaining wealth. He also believed democracy would quickly become slavery through mob rule. So, oligarchy would fall into an even worse form: slavery through debauchery-laden mob rule. Given enough time, the mob oligarchs’ power would dwindle and thus their hold over the population. Plato then mentioned this degenerative decline would result in tyranny, as people desired discipline and order at any cost to escape mob rule. To get this order within the state, tyranny would be necessary to suppress the mob. The problem was that the tyranny would not end with the mob. Over enough time, the tyrant would be overthrown by his people because of his harmful actions. From tyranny, we return to aristocracy as the tyrant falls and noble aristocrats seize control.

We hope the last paragraph sounded familiar. While we disagree with Plato on some key areas, the general concept of political decline and their reasons are similar. The pathway and problems are much the same now as they were during his time.

Let’s take it one step further and consider Polybius’s anacyclosis, which expanded on Plato’s Kyklos.

Polybius created the most developed version of anacyclosis, which is still very relevant to modern times. He states that the government forms cycle through in the following order: (1) monarchy (2) tyranny (3) aristocracy (4) oligarchy (5) democracy, and (6) ochlocracy (which is “mob-rule” or degenerative democracy).

While Polybius has six steps, he actually believes in fewer government forms than Plato. Each even-numbered option is simply the degenerative form of the preceding odd number. So, a tyrannical kingship is the degenerative form of monarchy. Democracy is the virtuous preceding form until ochlocracy. Thus, we note three primary positive governments: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Rule-by-one, rule-by-few, and rule-by-many. Likewise, we can see the three degenerative forms as tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy. Likewise, a rule-by-one, rule-by-few, and rule-by-many framework.

How do these political regimes cycle through one another? In direct quotation from The Histories, Polybius states:

Now the first of these to come into being is monarchy, its growth being natural and unaided; and next arises kingship derived from monarchy by the aid of art and by the correction of defects. Monarchy first changes into its vicious allied form, tyranny; and next, the abolishment of both gives birth to aristocracy. Aristocracy by its very nature degenerates into oligarchy; and when the commons inflamed by anger take vengeance on this government for its unjust rule, democracy comes into being; and in due course the license and lawlessness of this form of government produces mob-rule to complete the series. The truth of what I have just said will be quite clear to anyone who pays due attention to such beginnings, origins, and changes as are in each case natural. For he alone who has seen how each form naturally arises and develops, will be able to see when, how, and where the growth, perfection, change, and end of each are likely to occur again.[vi]

This transition is important, as are his concluding words. We have to be able to see how each form arises and develops to gauge whether they are likely to occur again and how to stop them. This is where the particular regime cycle of collapse will later be relevant. After this description of government trends, Polybius dedicates the next few pages to providing even more explicit detail over how this transition occurs.

To summarize these next few pages: Polybius believes a benevolent dictatorship will naturally begin under monarchy. However, over time, the hereditary passing down of power will result in the children of the monarch taking power, who will abuse this power as an absolute dictator. The heirs will not always be benevolent. Thus, their kingship eventually results in tyranny. The aristocrats grow weary of the tyrants and overthrow them, leading to aristocracy. The individuals in charge of the aristocracy eventually abuse their powers to amass wealth and degenerate behavior leading to oligarchy, which attracts the ire of the population. When this happens, the population fights back to take control over the entire system through democratic means for reasons identical to Plato’s five regimes model. They cannot trust the king nor the aristocrats, so they put the power into their own hands. After enough time passes after this occurred, the children of the nation will grow up entitled and without the knowledge or understanding of the sacrifice it took to lead them to liberty. The children of the nation will not understand the freedom, equality, or economic prosperity that the system has given them and they will simply demand more and more. Their own downfall is their own birth privilege. They’ve become accustomed to what they’ve been given, which will make them seek excess. This behavior will manifest as mob rule, as they use mob tactics to fulfill their demands. Living off others’ property will result in even further plundering, taken to an extreme. This will lead the citizens to seek yet another “benevolent” monarch master as the situation deteriorates. Any form of order, even a tyrannical one, is preferential to mob rule chaos. This will cause the citizens to be conditioned to desire and fight for the demagogues under the false guise of order or equality. Chaos ensues, and the state goes full circle back to an absolute ruler.

Polybius’s anacyclosis continues to be just as relevant today as it was during his own time. His work was revolutionary and used as historical precedent by dozens of other notable authors throughout history. A couple notable examples of those who have used Polybius’s works include Francesco Sansovino (an Italian historian and statesman considered one of the major political writers of the Italian Renaissance) in his renaissance work and John Adams (A Founding Father of the United States) in his “Defence of the Constitution” work.

Let’s start with Francesco. In Paul Grendler’s account of Francesco, he states the following:

Sansovino viewed the growth and decline of states in terms of Polybius’ anacyclosis. The initially good government of one man, monarchy, became a tyranny. Then the state was renewed by the efforts of a few good men who made it an aristocracy. This in turn decayed into oligarchy and was replaced by democracy which became mob rule which, in turn was supplanted by one-man rule as the cycle continued. Sansovino noted that worthy men attempted unsuccessfully to establish principates or republics to endure a thousand years. The reasons for failure were twofold. By their nature all human institutions carried within themselves the seeds of corruption which were human excesses and disorders. Second, one could not provide for everything. The accidents which befell states were so many and so diverse that it was impossible to provide against, or to correct, all of them.[vii]

Two important pieces we can take from this account are the failings of human institutions and that one cannot provide for everything at the onset. Both items we address through our framework. The institutional issue is addressed in the sensitive cultural marker and cultural chapters. The inability to protect against all possibilities issue is corrected through various contributor remedies scattered throughout all the chapters. Sansovino’s account is incredibly important because it was the inspiration for what created the most powerful tool that our framework provides: the “nuclear option”. This amendment corrects both of Sansovino’s main points against thousand-year regimes. This is addressed in later chapters.

His account also notes the importance of worthy men in the formation of any government framework. Worthy men must be at the helm and to the benefit of all men.

Grendler goes on to say:

Sansovino formulated a simple pragmatic resolution which assumed that men would continue to live the vita civile and which justified the study of history. Neither very pessimistic nor excessively optimistic, Sansovino’s views reflected Italian political reality. He did not share the hope of Polybius and Machiavelli that a mixed constitution would check the cycle, but he believed that men normally could control their own affairs and learn from the experience of others.

Sansovino found worth in the Polybius model of anacyclosis because it generally aligned with his in-depth study of history. He correctly noted that a mixed constitution alone would not correct the cycle, something that Polybius and Machiavelli lacked. While beneficial, this mixed constitution will not solve all the problems. He did, however, believe there were ways out of the cycle through the study of history and the education of men. Men must learn from the experience of others through tradition, the study of history, and the involvement of vanguards.

Even in the much more recent future, powerful political figures have found use in the Polybius model. John Adams, in his Defence of the Constitution, wrote the following:

Polybius thinks it manifest, both from reason and experience, that the best form of government is not simple, but compounded, because of the tendency of each of the simple forms to degenerate; even democracy, in which it is an established custom to worship the gods, honour their parents, respect the elders, and obey the laws, has a strong tendency to change into a government where the multitude have a power of doing whatever they desire, and where insolence and contempt of parents, elders, gods, and laws, soon succeed.[viii]

Does this sound familiar? Ironically enough, it sounds exactly like what has happened in the United States already. Adams is discussing cultural degradation in this paragraph, which has undeniably occurred. Both Polybius and Adams understand the importance of traditions, family structures, law and order, and proper cultural controls. All things that the rule-by-many cannot contain. We had a compound government, but it did not save us forever.

Adams goes on to address the steps of anacyclosis:

From whence do governments originally spring? From the weakness of men, and the consequent necessity to associate, and he who excels in strength. and courage, gains the command and authority over provisions, differing little in their clothes or tables from the people with whom they passed their lives, they continued blameless and unenvied. But their posterity, succeeding to the government by right of inheritance, and finding every thing provided for security and support, they were led by superfluity to indulge their appetites, and to imagine that it became princes to appear in a different dress, to eat in a more luxurious manner, and enjoy, without contradiction, the forbidden pleasures of love. The first produced envy, the other resentment and hatred. By which means kingly government degenerated into tyranny.

At the same time a foundation was laid, and a conspiracy formed, for the destruction of those who exercised it; the accomplices of which were not men of inferior rank, but persons of the most generous, exalted, and enterprizing spirit; for such men can least bear the insolence of those in power. The people, having these to lead them, and uniting against their rulers, kingly government and monarchy were extirpated, and aristocracy began to be established, for the people, as an immediate acknowledgment to those who had destroyed monarchy, chose these leaders for their governors, and left all their concerns to them.

These, at first, preferred the advantage of the public to all other considerations, and administered all affairs, both public and private, with care and vigilance. But their sons having succeeded them in the same power, unacquainted with evils, strangers to civil equality and liberty, educated from their infancy in the splendor of the power and dignities of their parents, some giving themselves up to avarice, others to intemperance, and others to the abuse of women, by this behaviour changed the aristocracy into an oligarchy.

Their catastrophe became the same with that of the tyrants; for if any person, observing the general envy and hatred which these rulers have incurred, has the courage to say or do any thing against them, he finds the whole body of the people inspired with the same passions they were before possessed with against the tyrant, and ready to assist him. Thereupon they put some of them to death, and banish others; but dare not, after that, appoint a king to govern them, being still afraid of the injustice of the first; neither dare they entrust the government with any number of men, having still before their eyes the errors which those had before committed: so that having no hope, but in themselves, they convert the government from an oligarchy to a democracy, and cake upon themselves the care and charge of public affairs. And as long as any are living, who felt the power and dominion of the few, they acquiesce under the present establishment, and look upon equality and liberty as the greatest of blessings. But when a new race of men grows up, these, no longer regarding equality and liberty, from being accustomed to them, aim at a greater share of power than the rest, particularly those of the greatest fortunes, who, grown now ambitious, and being unable to obtain the power they aim at by their own merit, dissipate their wealth, by alluring and corrupting the people by every method; and when, to serve their wild ambition, they have once taught them to receive bribes and entertainments, from that moment the democracy is at an end, and changes to force and violence. For the people, accustomed to live at the expence of others, and to place their hopes of a support in the fortunes of their neighbours, if headed by a man of a great and enterprizing spirit, will then have recourse to violence, and getting together, will murder, banish, and divide among themselves the lands of their adversaries, till, grown wild with rage, they again find a master and a monarch.

This is the rotation of governments, and this the order of nature, by which they are changed, transformed, and return to the same point of the circle.

Adams lived nearly two thousand years after Polybius but came to the same conclusions on the cycle of regime change. Adams tried to create a system that would prevent this from happening, but as we read his theory, we can draw perfect parallels with modern America. These trends occur in anacyclosis innately because of human nature. We cannot change the nature of humans, so the only way to address the problem is to change the entire framework that we are residing within to properly account for that human nature.

He notes that the rule-by-many form generally falls because the new generations are not brought up appropriately and a certain category of men who “aim at a greater share of power than the rest” form. This was Adam’s recognition to the centralizer problem. This is a major recurring theme throughout the historical texts. Any framework that is to be resilient to the cycle must not have the same weaknesses present in the rule-by-many form (allowances given to centralizers).

John Adams also had the following to say on the correction of the cycle (continued from the same source):

But perhaps it might be more exactly true and natural to say, that the king, the aristocracy, and the people, as soon as ever they felt themselves secure in the possession of their power, would begin to abuse it. In Mr. Turgot’s single assembly, those who should think themselves most distinguished by blood and education, as well as fortune, would be most ambitious; and if they found an apparition among their constituents to their elections, would immediately have recourse to entertainments, secret intrigues, and every popular art, and even to bribes, to increase their parties. This would oblige their competitors, though they might be infinitely better men, either to give up their pretensions, or to imitate these dangerous practices. There is a natural and unchangeable inconvenience in all popular elections. There are always competitions, and the candidates have often merits nearly equal. The virtuous and independent electors are often divided: this naturally causes too much attention to the most profligate and unprincipled, who will sell or give away their votes for other considerations than wisdom and virtue. So that he who has the deepest purse, or the fewest scruples about using it, will generally prevail.

It is from the natural aristocracy in a single assembly that the first danger is to be apprehended in the present state of manners in America; and with a balance of landed property in the hands of the people, so decided in their favour, the progress to degeneracy, corruption, rage, and violence, might not be very rapid; nevertheless it would begin with the first elections, and grow faster or slower every year. Rage and violence would soon appear in the assembly, and from thence be communicated among the people at large.

The only remedy is to throw the rich and the proud into one group, in a separate assembly, and there tie their hands; if you give them scope with the people at large, or their representatives, they will destroy all equality and liberty, with the consent and acclamations of the people themselves. They will have much more power, mixed with the representatives, than separated from them. In the first case, if they unite, they will give the law, and govern all; if they differ, they will divide the state, and go to a decision by force. But placing them alone by themselves, the society avails itself of all their abilities and virtues; they become a solid check to the representatives themselves, as well as to the executive power, and you disarm them entirely of the power to do mischief.

Adams notes numerous important items in this brief text. First, he mentions the issue that virtuous and independent electors are often divided and that the “unprincipled” will generally sell or give away their votes by using them unwisely. So, whoever is a financial centralizer or doesn’t mind bankrupting the nation in the pursuit of power, will always win elections. We take this threat seriously because it seems apparent in nearly every failing rule-by-many form. We correct it through our contributor voting system and order system.

The account of Adams is interesting because it recognizes a massive threat that had otherwise gone undetected by many other anacyclosis researchers. Specifically, “the rich and the proud” line in the last paragraph. He notices how quickly a small group can degrade the whole. He states this group should be “a separate assembly, and there tie their hands.” So, they should not only be separated but restrained as well. Much of our work is on doing just this. Whenever we address centralizer groups, we are directly addressing this issue.

Adams also addressed the issues of weak men, the need for a compound government, removing cultural degeneracy, averting mob rule, and the necessity of virtue. Things that are all essential to stopping anacyclosis, given historical trends and research accounts. His words are valued and are all implemented by Enclavism in some manner.

John Adams was not the only American Founding Father to speak on the subject. Another notable individual was George Washington himself. He gave a farewell address prior to his retirement with the following statements:

This government, the offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with energy, and containing within itself a provision for its own amendment, has a just claim to your confidence and your support. Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true liberty. The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government. But the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish government presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established government.[ix]

This section is important. In it, Washington addresses the issue of having a changeable constitution, but one that can only be changed under the right conditions. He states that the constitution can only be changed by an “explicit and authentic act of the whole people.” Which is definitely not provided in modern America. A constitution could only be changed by the people if it were approved with numerous safeguards that could not be subverted. Also, the constitution has lacked power in America because of the rejection of originalist legal interpretations (meaning it can be changed by a cultural judiciary, not the entirety of its people) and the inability of the people to hold the political centralizer accountable to that constitution. Additionally, the constitution must be obligatory to all. It is not negotiable or removable by any centralizer. Our framework remedies each of these problems.

Washington goes on to say:

Towards the preservation of your government, and the permanency of your present happy state, it is requisite, not only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretexts. One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the Constitution, alterations which will impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments as of other human institutions; that experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country; that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change, from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember, especially, that for the efficient management of your common interests, in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable. Liberty itself will find in such a government, with powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is, indeed, little else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction, to confine each member of the society within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property.

George Washington noted numerous very key trends of an anacyclosis-resistant government. He addressed the importance of stopping political partisanship (which causes division, especially when it is geographical), of stopping too far-out cultural anomalies appearing throughout the nation (that would produce geographic division), of a mixed government and constitution, of the importance of a proper morality, and of a proper distribution of power. All essential characteristics of preserving a national soul through the system.

Later in the speech, Washington also addresses the serious threat of foreign involvement and foreign influence on republics. He states:

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.

Foreign influence is a massive red flag for any rule-by-many government. Foreign centralizers or other provocative agents can help the domestic centralizers acquire a base of power to further exploit. In extreme cases, it can create a type of vassal state rule-by-few where the foreigner indirectly controls the “representatives” of the many. Careful watch must be placed on the foreign arena for any sustainable system.

All of these items are included in our theory of Enclavism but with far higher protections than the historic America was provided with. We take these items and expand on them in multitudes.

The reason the United States was a successful republic for a period of time is likely because of the actions of the Founding Fathers in implementing some of these beliefs. They helped, but clearly did not fully resolve, the issue of anacyclosis.

Too many loopholes still existed in the American framework even though the founders discussed them in-depth. Many key items they desired were never successfully implemented. For example, John Adams’s “tying of the hands” never got implemented. Neither did Washington’s distrust of foreign involvement get the proper credit it deserved.[x] These are only a couple of the dozens of safeguards that were left behind in the implementation of the American Republic.

Marcus Tullius Cicero, in 54 B.C., in his work “The Republic of Cicero” even had some things to mention on the topic. Regretfully, we are missing some of his key work due to the loss of the historical documents, but we do have some preserved statements from Cicero:

… and this great mischief arises whether under the rule of the better class, or under a tyrannical faction, or under the regal government; and even frequently under the popular form. At the same time from the various forms of government of which I have spoken, something excellent is wont to emanate. For the changes and vicissitudes in public affairs, appear to move in a circle of revolutions; which when recognized by a wise man, as soon as he beholds them impending, if he can moderate their course in the administration of affairs, and restrain them under his control; he acts truly the part of a great citizen, and almost of a divine man. Therefore I think a fourth kind of government, moderated and mixed from those three of which I first spoke, is most to be approved.[xi]

In this, Cicero is stating that all three forms (rule-by-many, rule-by-one, rule-by-few) are less than desirable. A fourth, being a mixture of the three, is desired. In several respects, this is what Enclavism does.

Additionally, Cicero notes how those leaders who can withstand the circle of revolutions are wise men, perhaps even divine men. This was the power of the cycle, especially during Cicero’s time: that it might take a divine man to stop it within the context of the current frameworks. He goes on:

And this I say of these three kinds of government, not of the agitations and disturbances incidental to them, but of their tranquil and regular state. Those varieties are principally remarkable for the defects I have alluded to. Then they have other pernicious failings, for every one of these governments is travelling a dangerous road, bordering on a slippery and precipitous path.

In short, Cicero is saying all the legacy frameworks will collapse eventually. He goes on to recommend a way to correct it:

For as in stringed instruments or pipes, as well as in singing with voices, a certain harmony is to be formed with distinct sounds, an interruption to which cannot be borne by refined ears; this kindred and harmonious concert being produced by the modification of dissimilar voices. So a government temperately organized from the upper, the lower and middle orders blended together, harmonizes like music by the agreement of dissimilar sounds. And that which in song is called by musicians, harmony, is concord in a state; the strongest and best bond of safety in every republic; yet which without justice cannot be preserved.

Hierarchical harmony. An essential element of any sustainable state. Cicero noted some interesting elements of a sustainable government all the way back in 54 BC. This is how long the cycle has been occurring and how long humanity has refused to learn from history.

Cicero, in De republica, speaks in-depth on a few key topics. These topics include a well-regulated mixture of the three government forms (no strict democracy or rule-by-many), the need for a proper distribution of national hierarchy (upper, middle, and lower. Meaning to not seek out “equality” or similar agents against a natural order), and the importance of understanding the “regular curving path” from which governments follow.

These items are equally important, as more modern republics have demonstrated. If any class becomes too powerful over the others, massive problems form. If any of the government forms are left entirely to their own devices, they will degrade. Addressing these items are key issues of addressing anacyclosis, and what future political theorists had desired to expand upon.

Other more recent historical figures, such as Machiavelli, Giambattista Vico, Julius Evola, and Montesquieu, have noted this trend as well.

Starting with Montesquieu:

Book 8. On the corruption of the principles of the three governments.

Chapter 2. On the corruption of the principle of democracy.

The principle of democracy is corrupted not only when the spirit of equality is lost but also when the spirit of extreme equality is taken up and each one wants to be equal to those chosen to command. So the people, finding intolerable even the power they entrust to the others, want to do everything themselves: to deliberate for the senate, to execute for the magistrates, and to cast aside all the judges.[xii]

The above paragraph addresses the issue of the nonmerit effect in rule-by-many forms and the issue of equality. Equality becomes a desirable trait in a democracy, but it is never a practical trait that can sustain itself. It rejects the natural order and traditional hierarchy of humanity. This is especially important regarding high-profile societal positions, such as the political class. When the less-than-worthy fill these roles, the nation will degrade rapidly. It is essential that those “chosen to command” are solidified within their positions.

Montesquieu goes on:

Corruption will increase among those who corrupt, and it will increase among those who are already corrupted. The people will distribute among themselves all the public funds; and, just as they will join the management of business to their laziness, they will want to join the amusements of luxury to their poverty. But given their laziness and their luxury, only the public treasure can be their object.

One must not be astonished to see votes given for silver. One cannot give the people much without taking even more from them; but, in order to take from them, the state must be overthrown. The more the people appear to take advantage of their liberty, the nearer they approach the moment they are to lose it. Petty tyrants are formed, having all the vices of a single one. What remains of liberty soon becomes intolerable. A single tyrant rises up, and the people lose everything, even the advantages of their corruption.

Therefore, democracy has to avoid two excesses: the spirit of inequality, which leads it to aristocracy or to the government of one alone, and the spirit of extreme equality, which leads it to the despotism of one alone, as the despotism of one alone ends by conquest.

The issues that Montesquieu brings to the forefront are certainly viable contentions. Any system that seeks to fix their cycle permanently must invariably address the issues he raises, which are virtue, the soul of the people, corruption, and the issue of “votes for silver” (the funds of contributors being used to buy the votes of noncontributors). All relevant pieces of anti-anacyclosis.

There are two major topics here to point out.

The first is that Montesquieu correctly notices the effect of bad voters in democracy. This should be a recurring theme at this point, but he specifically addresses the problem to a fuller extent. This gives us a couple of important lessons. First, those who have the highest say in voting must be those who contribute the most, to avoid the issues of problematic voters. This is the platform for our contributor voting system called “oversight voting”. Noncontributors must be discouraged in order to halt their potential dependency-laden corruption. Second, the politicians must never be put in a position where they are incentivized for short-term gain to partake in corrupt acts. They must never have a strong incentive to “buy out” votes of noncontributors. The incentive must always be placed on pleasing contributors. Neither should they feel constant pressure from the lower societal arenas with regard to the potential loss of their position. Their positions must be somewhat similar to the positions of a rule-by-few, so they are more interested in effective ruling than they are in struggling to keep their power through the use of corruption, short-term policies, mobs, or low-information voters. We accomplish this through our Order system.

The second topic is on equality. The nation cannot sustain itself if it becomes too unequal because then it would become or be at risk of a rule-by-few. This is offset by our tackling of centralizers, especially of the isolated class. But the problem is just as bad if looked at inversely. If the nation becomes too equal, then merit will take a backseat and despotism arises. This means that overreaching equality must be thoroughly rejected and shut down, which is a component of our cultural baseline.

Proceeding onward to Julius Evola, a traditionalist. He draws on the work related to de Gobineau, René Guénon, and Nietzsche. Evola states in his work “Revolt Against the Modern World”:

Among various writers, de Gobineau is the one who probably better demonstrates the insufficiency of the majority of the empirical causes that have been adduced to explain the decline of great civilizations. He showed, for instance, that a civilization does not collapse simply because its political power has been either broken or swept away: “The same type of civilization sometimes endures even under a foreign occupation and defies the worst catastrophic events, while some other times, in the presence of mediocre mishaps, it just disappears”. Not even the quality of the governments, in the empirical (namely, administrative and organizational) sense of the word, exercises much influence on the longevity of civilizations. De Gobineau remarked that civilizations, just like living organisms, may survive for a long time even though they carry within themselves disorganizing tendencies in addition to the spiritual unity that is life of the one common Tradition […] Not even the so-called corruption of morals, in its most profane and moralistically bourgeois sense, may be considered the cause of the collapse of civilizations; the corruption of morals at most may be an effect, but it is not the real cause. In almost every instance we have to agree with Nietzsche, who claimed that wherever the preoccupation with “morals” arises is an indication that a process of decadence is already at work; the mos of Vico’s “heroic ages” has nothing to do with moralistic limitations. The Far Eastern tradition especially has emphasized the ideas that morals and laws in general (in a conformist and social sense) arise where “virtue” and the “Way” are no longer known […] Rites, institutions, laws, and customs may still continue to exist for a certain time; but with their meaning lost and their “virtue” paralyzed they are nothing but empty shells. Once they are abandoned to themselves and have become secularized, they crumble like parched clay and become increasingly disfigured and altered, despite all attempts to retain from the outside, whether through violence or imposition, the lost inner unity. As long as a shadow of the action of the superior element remains, however, and an echo of it exists in the blood, the structure remains standing, the body still appears endowed with a soul, and the corpse—to use to image employed by de Gobineau—walks and is still capable of knocking down obstacles in its path. When the last residue of the force from above and of the race of the spirit is exhausted, in the new generations nothing else remains; there is no longer a riverbed to channel the current that is now dispersed in every direction. What emerges at this point is individualism, chaos, anarchy, a humanist hubris, and degeneration in every domain. The dam is broken. Although a semblance of ancient grandeur still remains, the smallest impact is enough to make an empire or state collapse and be replaced with a demonic inversion, namely, with the modern, omnipotent Leviathan, which is a mechanized and “totalitarian” collective system.[xiii]

Evola, de Gobineau, and Nietzsche all bring up important points regarding the spiritual part of the life and death of civilizations. Even if we were to build the most flawless system in theory, if that system was heralded by a people who lose their “Way”, it is all for nothing. Any framework we create must take special measures to ensure that this traditional, metaphysical, “race of the spirit” part is placed at the forefront of importance. We address this by addressing what we call the soul of the nation. Where this national soul is an incorporeal essence of a nation, similar to that of an individual, that demonstrates a combination of the mind and spirit on a metaphysical level to produce the very “being” of the nation. It is the combination of the spiritually animating and the language, religion, morality, history, wisdom, mind, spirit, and everything else that makes up that essence of a people.

It is not enough to focus on the effects of decline, like morals and system weaknesses; we must also ensure our framework and system set up a linear pathway to the continuation of this soul of the nation. No form can do this by itself, but they can guarantee that it does nothing to inhibit the vanguard spirit and promotes every positive aspect that is necessary for the soul to thrive and sustain. It can also prevent those who so often target the soul to weaken the entire system. We can, and must, fortify the dam. This is one of our most essential tasks in crafting the Enclavist doctrine.

In later chapters, Evola also addresses the cycle of political governance. He continues:

Once the apex disappeared, authority descended to the level immediately below, that is, to the caste of warriors [from the Traditional apex]. The stage was then set for monarchs who were mere military leaders, lords of temporal justice and, in more recent times, political absolute sovereigns. In other words, regality of blood replaced regality of the spirit. […] This was essentially the age and the cycle of the great European monarchies. Then a second collapse occurred as the aristocracies began to fall into decay and the monarchies to shake at the foundations; through revolutions and constitutions they became useless institutions subject to the “will of the nation,” and sometimes they were even ousted by different regimes. […] Together with parliamentary republics the formation of the capitalist oligarchies revealed the shift of power from the second caste (the warrior) to the modern equivalent of the third caste (the mercantile class). The kings of coal, oil, and iron industries replace the previous kings of blood and spirit. […] At this time the social bond was no longer a fides of a warrior type based on relationships of faithfulness and honor. Instead, it took on a utilitarian and economic character; it consisted of an agreement based on personal convenience and on material interest that only a merchant could have conceived. Gold became a means and a powerful tool; those who knew how to acquire it and to multiply it (capitalism, high finance, industrial trusts), behind the appearances of democracy, virtually controlled political power and the instruments employed in the art of opinion making. […] Finally, the crises of bourgeois society, class struggle, the proletarian revolt against capitalism, the manifesto promulgated at the “Third International” (or Comintern) in 1919, and the correlative organization of the groups and the masses in the cadres proper to a “socialist civilization of labor”—all these bear witness to the third collapse, in which power tends to pass into the hands of the lowest of the traditional castes, the caste of the beasts of burden and the standardized individuals.[xiv]

Evola related the cycle of political collapse to that of the Kali Yuga. He noted how the cycle of structural collapse corresponded directly to the cycle of spiritual collapse and the transitioning of castes within the nation-state. Once focused on divine right and a traditional leadership, this declines to the warrior caste, which further declines to the merchant caste, and culminates in the decline to the proletarian caste having absolute power. It’s important to take into consideration that this view is one of a civilizational outlook, not specifically intra-national. The civilization as a whole follows this path. This process, Evola states, cannot be stopped. We can only go forward through it.

While we do not hold exactly to his linear progression, the recognition of the transition of power between the castes during civilization descent is not something we refute. Both the traditional and the warrior positions are given high importance within our framework, to not allow the leadership to degrade to one of the merchant or proletarian caste which has provoked many of the issues we will later attempt to rectify (individualism, capitalistic exploitation, wealth as a virtue, isolated class centralization, et cetera).

Evola also noticed how the isolated class becomes the main political driver during the mercantile stage and how the centralizers still hold absolute power, but all while residing under the illusion of democracy. This reality, once uncovered, leads directly to the mob effect, or what he calls the proletarian revolt against capitalism. Both factors that we attempt to remedy. We also fully agree with his position that there is no way to stop this degradation given our current positioning within it, besides going full force ahead through it.

Moving on to Giambattista Vico, who was a vigorous proponent of the monarchy form of governance (rule-by-one). He states:

The monarchical form was introduced in accordance with this eternal natural royal law, felt by all the nations which recognize in Augustus the founder of the Roman monarchy. … Pomponius, in his brief history of Roman law, discussing the royal law of which we speak, described it for us in the wellconsidered phrase: rebus ipsis dictantibus, regna condita “kingdoms were founded at the dictation of things themselves”.

This natural royal law is conceived under this natural formula of eternal utility: Since in the free commonwealths all look out for their own private interests, into the service of which they press their public arms at the risk of ruin to their nations, to preserve the latter from destruction a single man must arise, as Augustus did at Rome, and take all public concerns by force of arms into his own hands, leaving his subjects free to look after their private affairs and after just so much public business, and of just such kinds, as the monarch may entrust to them. Thus are the peoples saved when they would otherwise rush to their own destruction. In this truth the professors of modern law concur when they say that universitates sub rege habentur loco privatorum–”corporations are treated as private persons under the king”–because the majority of the citizens no longer concern themselves with the public welfare. Tacitus, most learned in the natural law of nations, points out as much in his Annals within the family of the Caesars itself, by this order of human civil ideas: As the death of Augustus became imminent, pauci bona libertatis incassum disserere–”a few spoke in vain of the blessings of liberty”; as soon as Tiberius came, omnes principis iussa ad spectare–”all looked to the commands of the emperor”; under the three subsequent Caesars first came incuria or indifference and finally ignorantia reipublicae tanquam alienae, ignorance of public affairs as something foreign. Thus, as the citizens have become aliens in their own nations, it becomes necessary for the monarchs to sustain and represent the latter in their own persons. Now in free commonwealths if a powerful man is to become monarch the people must take his side, and for that reason monarchies are by nature popularly governed: first through the laws by which the monarchs seek to make their subjects all equal; then by that property of monarchies whereby sovereigns humble the powerful and thus keep the masses safe and free from their oppressions; further by that other property of keeping the multitude satisfied and content as regards the necessaries of life and the enjoyment of natural liberty; and finally by the privileges conceded by monarchs to entire classes (called privileges of liberty) or to particular persons by awarding extraordinary civil honors to men of exceptional merit (these being singular laws dictated by natural equity). Hence monarchy is the form of government best adapted to human nature when reason is fully developed, as we have said before.[xv]

Vico is right in many contexts, but has lacked the historical insight regarding the damage that rule-by-one’s can cause and the inability for certain populations to truly “take his [the one’s] side” to be popularly governed.

For our use, what Vico uncovered was the fact that the average citizen that only looks out for their own private interests is the problem, which is certainly true. This is why our political class must demonstrate the exact opposite of this and all institutions in the nation should be run strictly by merit. While also sharing oversight by those not seeking self-interest. Additionally, the king benefitted the nation by keeping the other powerful interests in check, so they did not disturb the population. Our political class must do the same. Further, we must shift the societal focus from sole private individualism to a more communitarian approach. Our structure and Order system aim to correct this glaring issue with the rule-by-many framework, without having to resort to trying to stabilize a rule-by-one (totalitarian) approach.

Let us move on to Niccolò Machiavelli. In History of Florence, Machiavelli stated the following:

It may be observed, that provinces amid the vicissitudes to which they are subject, pass from order into confusion, and afterward recur to a state of order again; for the nature of mundane affairs not allowing them to continue in an even course, when they have arrived at their greatest perfection, they soon begin to decline. In the same manner, having been reduced by disorder, and sunk to their utmost state of depression, unable to descend lower, they, of necessity, reascend; and thus from good they gradually decline to evil, and from evil again return to good. The reason is, that valor produces peace; peace, repose; repose, disorder; disorder, ruin; so from disorder order springs; from order virtue, and from this, glory and good fortune. Hence, wise men have observed, that the age of literary excellence is subsequent to that of distinction in arms; and that in cities and provinces, great warriors are produced before philosophers. Arms having secured victory, and victory peace, the buoyant vigor of the martial mind cannot be enfeebled by a more excusable indulgence than that of letters; nor can indolence, with any greater or more dangerous deceit, enter a well regulated community. Cato was aware of this when the philosophers, Diogenes and Carneades, were sent ambassadors to the senate by the Athenians; for perceiving with what earnest admiration the Roman youth began to follow them, and knowing the evils that might result to his country from this specious idleness, he enacted that no philosopher should be allowed to enter Rome.[xvi]

Polybius noted the importance of the political regime. Machiavelli noted the importance of strong men. He also noted early Roman attempts to divert the cycle of collapse by focusing on strong men, strong government, aversion to foreigner integration, and not permitting philosophers in their midst (where philosophers are those that would inspire cultural and societal degradation—“men of words”). This was one tactic of many that ancient societies used in trying to break the cycle of collapse.

Machiavelli’s theory is closely related to the modern “Strong Men” theory and likely had its origins from it. The Strong Men theory is a simpler version of his words. It is the common saying: “Hard times create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. Weak men create hard times”.[xvii] The cycle then repeats. This is an oversimplification but an accurate rendition of the effect.

Niccolò’s theory, while not being as fully developed as Polybius’s, follows a similar pattern: good times lead toward prosperity, from prosperity toward indulgence, from indulgence toward weakness, from weakness toward evil, from evil toward conflict, from conflict toward strength, and from strength toward good times. Rinse, repeat.

Warriors, in the case of anacyclosis, are far more important than philosophers when considering practical political cycles. Just as strong, virtuous man is far more important to protect than degenerative men from a societal standpoint. This is the difference between the men of words versus the men of action. Understanding these intimate details about why the degeneration happens will be essential in stopping it. The men of action must always take precedence over the men of words.

Additionally, in Discourses, Machiavelli noted the importance of national hegemony, strong leadership, and aversion to foreign integration:

[…] But no time is given in the case of disorders in the State itself, which unless they be treated by some wise citizen, will always bring a city to destruction. From the readiness wherewith the Romans conferred the right of citizenship on foreigners, there came to be so many new citizens in Rome, and possessed of so large a share of the suffrage, that the government itself began to alter, forsaking those courses which it was accustomed to follow, and growing estranged from the men to whom it had before looked for guidance.[xviii]

Which provides further evidence of the necessity to preserve the “nation” element of the Three Essentials. If one alters the composition of the elements within the nation, it is only logical to recognize that the nation itself will likewise be fundamentally altered. This also demonstrates the need for strong and wise leadership, to avert disorders within the state itself.

Ryszard Legutko, a notable Polish statesman and professor of philosophy, summed up the historical greats’ positions, along with providing his own thoughts, in his book Demon in Democracy:

The argument of the ancient thinkers was simple, and it arose from an accurate observation, well-grounded in political experience, that most regimes are defective by being one-sided: that is, by going too much in one direction determined by the specificity of the group that exerts the predominant influence in the functioning of the system. This observation, one could say, anticipated Churchill’s view (or rather that Churchill’s view reiterated, in a slightly changed form, the classical insight). The ancients distinguished three basic types of regimes: monarchy (one-man rule), oligarchy, called sometimes aristocracy (minority rule), and democracy (majority rule). They regarded each of them as good in some aspects and deficient in others. Each system, then, while being superior to the alternatives, was also inferior to them. For example, the advantage of monarchy was that it simplified the decision-making process and gave it greater consistency; its disadvantage, among other things, was the danger of tyranny. The advantage of oligarchy was its educational elitism and its disadvantages a possible subordination of public interest to that of a minority group. The advantage of democracy was its representativeness and its disadvantages anarchy and factionalism.

A possible solution of the problem of one-sidedness was to mix the three types. One could therefore devise a political structure that combined monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy in such a way that each would foster the advantages and neutralize the disadvantages of the others. We would then have, for example, a democratic representativeness but at the same time some oligarchic-aristocratic institutions that would preserve a form of elitism as well as some form of monarchy guaranteeing the efficiency of governance. Such combination depended on the ingenuity of the politicians and the character of a particular society, and could produce a variety of hybrid political forms. When Cicero referred to this mixed regime, he used the name “res publica”. This was the beginning of a very important republican tradition in Western civilization.

In its modern versions, republicanism moved along complex paths, sometimes losing the original meaning (especially when used solely as a shorthand for revolutionary antimonarchism), but the main message given to it by the ancients was often preserved. The political community organized as a republic was a structure containing various elements, one being a democratic component. Even the American system, which today is regarded as the exemplary embodiment of representative democracy, was established as a hybrid construction. Some of the Founding Fathers regarded it as a major problem how to limit the rule of the demos and secure the proper role of the aristocratic element, whose responsibility would be the defense and propagation of ethical and political virtues. Tocqueville contemplated a similar problem, which seemed to him even more pressing, considering that he saw the advent of democracy as irresistible; in the new times that were approaching it then become a matter of utmost urgency to inject some aristocratic spirit into an ever more egalitarian society. [xix]

There is a lot to unpack in this short quotation. To begin, Legutko mentions the accurate observation of the ancients regarding the legacy rule-by forms going too far in their own direction. The issues with the current “hybrid” forms are that the power cycle and balance between the power centers is far off, leading to one extreme that permeates another. Slight democracy becomes a full-blown egalitarian and degenerate democracy, which is then a shorter skip to a rule-by-few due to its pure nature. The cycle of collapse in each form is between each of their full implementations. Therefore, if there are hybrid elements, those must be destroyed first to begin the process of anacyclosis. A pure rule-by-many egalitarian democracy will be the most decentralized variant of all, allowing easy access for centralizers to infiltrate and degenerate. Compared to that of a republic, which has rule-by-few elements, they must first take out the hybrid-nature.

Another interesting thing to note here is that only certain elements were made hybrid in the traditional republic form. Demos dominated. These aspects created a half-hearted hybrid in the form of the republic. Even the United States, which Legutko said is regarded as an exemplary embodiment of representative democracy, leaned far too heavily on the demos side. It needed far more elements of the rule-by-few and rule-by-one to sustain itself. However, if this ideal scenario had come to pass, the United States then wouldn’t have been classified as a rule-by-many. Therein lies the paradox of hybridization. We can seek hybrid forms all we want, but one of them must have at least a slight advantage over the others, which will then allow that dominant form to slowly homogenize its hybrid elements until it is pure. Once pure, it will degenerate in a traditional fashion. The only alternative is an altogether new option.

We need a new framework entirely, not a hybrid. In doing so, we can bring in components of each of the other forms, but then if they degenerate, they do not lean toward only one expression of a legacy framework. Our framework, for instance, could be called a rule-by-few, rule-by-one, or rule-by-many, depending on which component you are discussing. Even further, it could be called a hybrid of each within each element. Or more accurately, not a hybrid at all. Voting? A rule-by-many with a focus on a few where the majority can become that few through contributions. Politicians? A rule-by-few, with elements of a rule-by-one and oversight of a rule-by-many. Culture? A rule-by-one, where the one is a select few that anyone from the many may join with some effort. It seems complex now, but it will make sense in future chapters as we tie it all together. The takeaway is that our new form must not just be a plain hybrid but a different one altogether that even creates internal hybridization of the essential governmental elements. When we do this, we create what can only be defined as a “rule-by-contributor” because of the balancing elements it must entail to accurately capture each internal hybrid. At the end of it all, we must create a specialization for each element so that no pure legacy expression can be exploited.

Most of the Founding Fathers wanted stricter controls on demos, not more. They were right in that belief but unsuccessful in its implementation. The procedures that they put in the system did not suppress the demos elements forever. It is clear that modern America is now a full-blown liberal democracy, with a republic acting only in name (sometimes, not even that much). Which is why it has now begun rapid degeneration into a rule-by-few.

Finally, Legutko also mentions the problematic impact of political egalitarianism. Political egalitarianism is a method by which centralizers forcefully push for more rule-by-many elements at the expense of the hybrid elements by claiming to be in service of “equality” or “democracy” or some other meaningless buzzword. This, like many other language-controlled tools in a degenerating rule-by-many, is highly damaging to the hybrid elements that sustain it. When equality is the end goal and foundational myth, then destroying the surrounding elements that are meant to sustain the government is permitted. Respecting that there are social, economic, political, intellectual, and other differences between individuals must always triumph over political egalitarianism. Otherwise, the push for absolute democracy will push the nation right off a cliff. It is simple, the nation must have hierarchy.

Sir John Glubb also noticed similar trends as the preceding authors. In The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival, he wrote extensively about degenerating empires. A brief summary is followed:

• (d) The stages of the rise and fall of great nations seem to be:
  • The Age of Pioneers
  • The Age of Conquests
  • The Age of Commerce
  • The Age of Affluence
  • The Age of Intellect
  • The Age of Decadence
• (e) Decadence is marked by:
  • Defensiveness
  • Pessimism
  • Materialism
  • Frivolity
  • An influx of foreigners
  • The welfare state
  • A weakening of religion.
• (f) Decadence is due to:
  • Too long a period of wealth and power
  • Selfishness
  • Love of money
  • The loss of a sense of duty.
• (g) The life histories of great states are amazingly similar and are due to internal factors.[xx]

While the stages of great nations could be debated, the trend is generally sound and in line with other historical figures. His theory on decadence, however, is spot-on, along with the recognition that it is internal factors, not external pressures, that bring about the decline of nations. They destroy themselves, as most other political theorists have noted. Correcting each of these is essential for any sustainable framework.

He also noted a general timespan of around 250 years for most empires. He tracked empires such as Assyria (859-612 BC), Persia (538-330 BC), Greece (331-100 BC), Roman Republic (260-27 BC), Roman Empire (27 BC-AD 180), Arab Empire (634-880 AD), Mameluke Empire (1250-1517 AD), Ottoman Empire (1320-1570 AD), Spain (1500-1750 AD), Romanov Russia (1682-1916 AD), Britain (1700-1950 AD), and others. His expertise was in the Arabian and British regions, but similar trends were noted in empires worldwide. While not all empires follow this linear path exactly, it can easily be argued that the majority do. There is definitely an average duration of recycling that occurs using the legacy forms, excluding the occasional exceptions to the trend.

Sir John Glubb recognized these empires were completely different in terms of ethnicity, culture, and about every other generalization you could classify them under, but they all lasted around the same time and died for the same reasons. Why? The cycle of collapse.

Let us briefly walk through his theory. The Age of Pioneers is when the nation is first forming and solidifying itself. It is marked by brave men and a constant fight for success and survival. After the nation is settled, these men of action change to seek riches. The Age of Conquest leads the nation to great riches, wealth, and power. During this stage and the first half of the Age of Commerce, the virtues of courage, patriotism, unity, and truthfulness are everywhere. The people are rough, hardy, proud, and strong. Duty is witnessed everywhere. Pride and honor are in the air.

Then, the descent begins. Courage and duty gradually decline in the nation because the nation has vast wealth that was gained during their conquests, and the traits that made these riches possible are regarded as no longer needed. Many times, they are even regarded as primitive. Greed becomes commonplace. Where the nation used to be focused on self-sacrifice and duty, the nation turns inward, and individualism takes hold. With it comes covetousness and avarice. The Age of Affluence is then ushered in. With it, the voice of duty is fully silenced. The young no longer desire honor or service, but they instead seek money. Education shifts and focuses on teaching random unfulfilling qualifications instead of creating brave patriots. Degeneracy and selfishness become near requirements to thrive.

The Age of Intellect follows and shifts the focus even further on descent. Philosophers overtake the sacrificial warriors. The men of action are replaced by the men of words. Internal strife increases significantly because of the increasing tension between different intellectuals and ideologies. Individuals reject the idea that the nation does not depend on loyalty and self-sacrifice, which is the hallmark of great nations in their early stages. Mental cleverness trumps virtue. Foreigners often arise in great numbers during this period, as the nation is still very wealthy but is now dominated by emotionally inclined “intellectuals.” The empire is less protective than their earlier counterparts and thus immigration can increase to extraordinary levels. Welfare-type programs and policies increase dramatically. As generally comes with extensive focuses on intellect without other proper outlets, pessimism and nihilism arise as well.

Finally, as all the virtues and beliefs that lead to their original victories vanish, the nation itself vanishes. The descent follows the Age of Intellect. The Age of Decadence marks the culmination of these effects and the nation-state eventually collapses. Pioneers are then needed to start again.

One of the main points that Sir Glubb makes that is incredibly important to grasp is that greed and individualism take over, instead of the original virtues that led to their apex in the Age of Affluence. The nation employs proper virtues and an honorable soul to become affluent but then becomes degraded after being rich for an extended amount of time. This is similar to most of the preceding authors’ analyses.

Glubb even noted trends as obvious today as the focus on how the conception of heroes shifts over time: where a nation once looked up to distinguished statesmen, military men, and literary geniuses, the nation now reveres athletes, singers, or actors. This small shift clearly signifies the cultural shift witnessed from a devotion to self-sacrifice, honor, and duty to one of wealth and fame. A shift from the positive to negative; from the higher to lower form.

No nation can survive that places money over courage. It’s simply not possible. This is why culture and a proper upbringing of children are so paramount. It’s also why nationalism and defense of the national population must play a large role in any sustainable framework. Both are far more important than economic function, individualism, or another self-focused trait. Men of words must also never be placed above men of action. The citizens must never be allowed to enter a state free of struggle, even if artificial solely for developmental purposes.

All of these are good examples of what occurs during this cycle of collapse. These shifting attitudes have occurred in every nation that has collapsed, from the Arabian Empire, to the Roman Empire, to Venezuela, to Zimbabwe, and even to the modern Western world. It happens everywhere.

Sir John Glubb also stated the following in the Fate of Empires:

Would it help? It is pleasing to imagine that, from such studies, a regular life-pattern of nations would emerge, including an analysis of the various changes which ultimately lead to decline, decadence and collapse. It is tempting to assume that measures could be adopted to forestall the disastrous effects of excessive wealth and power, and thence of subsequent decadence. Perhaps some means could be devised to prevent the activist Age of Conquests and Commerce deteriorating into the Age of Intellect, producing endless talking but no action.[xxi]

This sentiment is exactly what we are trying to do with Enclavism: use the historical realities to discover the life-patterns of nations to find a way to conquer this never-ending cycle. Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and plenty of other important historical figures had also wished for the same objective. Attempting to find ways to stop the Age of Intellect, and even component pieces of the Age of Affluence, is key.

Henning Webb Prentis Jr. shared a similar opinion to that of Sir John Glubb. Prentis was an American industrialist who developed the “Prentis Cycle.” Much of his work is often misattributed to others such as Alexander Tytler or Alexis de Tocqueville, which likely includes the famous “Tytler Cycle” and “Fatal Sequence” theories. Both Tocqueville and Tytler expressed similar critical views of democracy, likely leading to the misattribution. The expanded Prentis Cycle is followed:

From bondage to spiritual faith; from spiritual faith to courage; from courage to freedom; from freedom to abundance; from abundance to selfishness; from selfishness to complacency; from complacency to apathy; from apathy to fear; from fear to dependency; and from dependency back to bondage once more.[xxii]

This cycle shares a familiar theme by this point. We see a powerful national soul leading the people out of tyranny, which degrades to excess and individualism, then further degrades to apathy and weakness, and ends in dependency and collapse. The focus on freedom, abundance, and individualism overtakes the necessary vanguard attributes of courage and the national soul. Any framework put in place to overcome this cycle must make sure it stops this distortion from occurring. Prentis spoke about this trend in relation to democratic government, but as we will soon see in the next section, it actually relates to both the cycle of collapse and anacyclosis.

A more modern work, The Collapse of Complex Societies by Joseph Tainter, is also worth mention. Tainter uses nearly two dozen cases of political collapse to create a model to evaluate how societies fall. He believes that collapse occurs because of diminishing marginal returns as the level of complexity of a state increases. This diminishment occurs in the realm of problem-solving capacity. As the state rises in power, it increases in managerialism and complexity. The state cannot retract in terms of complexity. Given enough time, the cost to maintain that state will exceed the cost of the resources that are necessary to solve their problems. Eventually, a shock occurs, and the state collapses due to this resource allocation failure. Tainter defines a complex society as one that has a lot of heterogeneity and centralization. Both of which are inevitable given the legacy frameworks and the cycle, as we have discussed. Both of which we would agree are also clear problems that directly impact anacyclosis. Tainter’s theory is of interest, but focuses more on the overall picture rather than the exact component pieces that we are trying to resolve. Still, the issues that he raises are accurate and worth consideration. We focus on correcting the reasons why increasing complexity, heightened managerialism, and diminishing marginal returns happen. As centralizers acquire more power and control, the marginal return provided by the centralized institutions diminishes. Their ability to solve societal-level problems decreases. This creates an unsustainable environment. An environment where a simple shock can create a cataclysmic result. We address each of these problems in future chapters.

Let’s move on to a few notable last mentions on the study of anacyclosis. A less relevant but still noteworthy account comes from Hesiod’s Five Ages and Ovid’s Four Ages, where they address a gradual descent of humanity to a rougher and more evil age. This generally aligns with the cycle of governance, even though they were speaking of the ages of man, instead of the ages of nations. Still, the theme and descent are similar, descending from a “Golden Age” to our current situation, the “Iron Age.” For the curious reader, they are worth looking into.

Another notable mention is the Yuga theory taken from Hinduism. The Pancharatra text, Vishnu Purana, explains this in great detail. Kali Yuga is the final (fourth) stage of the Yuga Cycles. It is believed that we are currently in this cycle, which is full of debauchery and conflict. The idea is that each Yuga’s length and their respective moral state is decreased by one fourth as each Yuga cycle transitions. Meaning that the length and the moral climate deteriorate more rapidly after each prior stage. Then the cycle repeats from the beginning. It is easy to relate these four cycles to the cycles of civilizations, governments, and the national souls of people. They start off strong and then deteriorate at a much more rapid pace the further on the cycle that they are. The same often occurs during anacyclosis. Degeneration is exponential, not linear.

Additionally, many of the afflictions mentioned within the Hindu text have been incredibly accurate, such as the disintegration of marriage, the totalitarianism of states, and the domination of money through all facets of life. Regarding the Hindu theory that we are currently living in the Kali Yuga, at least in terms of governmental deterioration, I would wholeheartedly concur. However, the timeline is debatable. Still, this provides the need for a traditional point when seeking sustainment, for this point rests itself further from accelerating degeneration.

It is of interest that even religions recognize the cycle of birth-death-rebirth, especially of moral and spiritual manners. We see this in all major world religions, from the resurrection of Christ[xxiii] to the Kali Yuga theories of Hinduism to Confucianism Yin-yang to Buddhist reincarnation and so forth. Perhaps the cycle we witness with all of these aspects of humanity is truly transcendent, but that is a topic for another time.

A more modern author, Peter Turchin, also has insightful books on the rise and fall of nations.[xxiv] Two works are worth particular mention. “War and Peace and War” argues that the formative years of great empires are due to their capacity for collective action (what we would call communitarianism and vanguard formation). Whereas internal conflict due to various factors, such as an isolated class and the proliferation of individualism, leads to the decline. Another one of his works, The Secular Cycles, finds four stages of anacyclosis. These stages are expansion, stagflation, crisis, and disintegration. There is a leading emphasis on population expansion during the expansion stage. In this work, he finds that eventually there are too many elites at the stagflation and crisis stage that are then forced to fight with each other, which shares similarities to our own theory regarding the centralizers. He proves the validity of this topic through mathematics, critical historical analysis, and statistical modeling.

Alexis de Tocqueville likewise has some excellent commentary on problems within democracy and the rule-by-many form, but is limited mostly to that framework. An understanding of his work, most notably Democracy in America, will be useful to us in the next chapter.[xxv]

Many other works, such as The Rise and Decline of Nations by Mancur Olson, The Decline of the West by Oswald Spengler, and Suicide of a Superpower by Patrick Buchanan, are also suitable reference materials for added study on the political cycle of collapse. Within this short list, Olson focuses on the economic components of collapse, Spengler concentrates on cultures evolving as organisms into civilizations and facing a repetitive flourish-to-decline cycle (through a spiritual death of the soul), and Buchanan pinpoints the religiosity and moral deterioration that coincided with the demographic destruction of the heritage Americans. We already have or will address each of these issues in this book, but for a deeper review these works are still recommended.

There are certainly plenty of other great works on this subject, but we have covered the majority of the prevailing theories. Still, other works can be helpful for further in-depth journeys into particular problems, places, or systems if they are of interest.[xxvi]

This concludes our review of the literature on anacyclosis. Now, picture an hourglass. When the government enters a new legacy political regime, it flips the hourglass to allow the sand to pour down. Some sand timers will be given a lot of sand; some will be given very little. Once the sands reach half, we have reached the degenerative stage of that government. Once the sand fully reaches the bottom, the next leader flips the hourglass and we enter the next regime. This cycle never ends.

During each degenerative stage, the people suffer. After each degenerative regime collapse, the virtuous citizens are left to pick up the pieces and try to rebuild, only to be placed in the exact same scenario whenever the next collapse comes about again. This cycle holds back humanity and destroys entire nations of people in the process.

These authors that span over two thousand years with various backgrounds and specialities all present a slightly different but eerily similar picture of anacyclosis, at least enough to help us trend it. We now know the overall contributing factors that drive the political cycle of regime change. We also know the previous theories and their intricacies. But what is the overall force that of which instigates these changes? How do we connect all of these theories and use them to solve the problem?

While our theory is not far off from the original theory of anacyclosis, there is clear differentiation. So, let us move on to how our theory differs from these ancient theories of political regime change.

Section 2: Our Cycle of Collapse Theory

We are fortunate to have a much larger timeframe to study than the ancients did, but the conclusions are still much the same. Hindsight perception provides us even more insights than that of which they could have studied in their time. Still, Polybius witnessed the rise of fall of a tremendous number of city-states in historical times. Both he and Plato had a playground of governments they could watch in fast motion. This allowed them the unparalleled ability to study the rise and fall of governments. This is quite unlike today, where there tend to be fewer governments numerically, but they follow the same patterns. We also use newer names for newer or different systems, but the frameworks themselves have not shifted.

Regardless of the changes, the evidence is clear. Every single region and country follow a pattern, with few if any anomalies usually comprising only tiny and completely homogeneous nations. We agree with Polybius and later authors on most of the reasons and methods of descent in anacyclosis. Additionally, we agree with the reasons for why the legacy frameworks degenerate. Each of the quotes we provided in the last section are still applicable to the modern day. We don’t want to just repeat the same problem here that has been documented for centuries, so instead we focus on refining the theory that knits together the full sequence, encapsulating each discernable piece provided by the ancients. Then, to provide solutions.

Let us first clarify phrases. Anacyclosis is the cycle of regime change. It is how each government framework relates to one another through this cyclical nature of regime change. It explains how and why a democracy (rule-by-many) turns into an oligarchy (rule-by-few), which turns into a monarchy (rule-by-one), and then repeats. Anacyclosis is the full sequence. The “Cycle of Collapse” specifically looks at how each independent framework degenerates. So anacyclosis includes all of them and their connection: rule-by-many, rule-by-few, and rule-by-one. Anacyclosis describes how each of them interconnects in the constant recycling of government forms. Whereas the cycle of collapse would focus on only one at a time, such as how a democracy degrades into an oligarchy. Thus, there are three cycles of collapse: the cycle of collapse for the rule-by-many, the cycle of collapse for the rule-by-few, and the cycle of collapse for the rule-by-one. There is only one anacyclosis.

Each of these frameworks demonstrates a linear path toward collapse. If we break the linear path, we break the cycle of collapse, which then breaks anacyclosis. If the framework itself cannot degenerate, then anacyclosis cannot proceed. Since the frameworks all fall due to some aspect of centralization, if we can stop the problems with centralization, then we can stop the linear path from deteriorating.

We focus primarily on the overall anacyclosis and the cycle of collapse for the rule-by-many in this text. There is little reason to focus on the cycle of collapse of the other two frameworks because the rule-by-many is the most challenging of the frameworks to hybridize and sustain, but we need elements from it to prevent the failings prevalent within the other two (most notably, unaccountable centralization). Our hands are tied in the need to work outward from this feeble framework.

There are two prevailing approaches to any form of collapse: the internal and external view. An external collapse is something outside of the nation-side that causes an inability to sustain the state, such as a natural disaster or an invasion. An internal collapse is something that occurs from within the nation-state that causes its own degeneration, leading to collapse. We waste little time in this text regarding external collapses, because most of them (excluding a few incredibly rare events) are only successful due to a preceding internal degeneration that renders the nation-state unable to successfully adapt or avert the external phenomenon. In effect, the vast majority of collapses stem from internal reasons. For example, both Western and Eastern Rome did not fall solely because of their neighboring invaders, but because of a pervasive weakening that had been transpiring internally for centuries prior. All societies face external pressures, but non-degenerative states can withstand them through adaptation or resilience. For external forces to be successful in causing a collapse, internal forces must have already succumbed. Therefore, we must place our emphasis on the internal attributes to provide resilience for both the external and internal.

Now, let’s briefly recall Polybius’s anacyclosis. We begin with a monarchy, which is a positive form of rule-by-one. This could be a benevolent leadership with a sovereign who truly cares about their constituents and seeks to act in their best interests. This descends into tyranny, which is a negative form of rule-by-one. Perhaps the child of the monarch is a despot. He only seeks power and control. The aristocrats despise this rule. Eventually, this regime is overthrown and an aristocracy forms, which is a positive form of the rule-by-few. An example would be a band of nobles that get together to overthrow the tyrant and then usher in an era of peace and prosperity. However, as the hands of power change over time, this too degrades into an oligarchy, which is a negative form of the rule-by-few. This occurs when the “few” seek power, wealth, and privilege above the average citizens. These few have forgotten their ancestor’s initial struggles against the king. Over time, the people tire of this oligarchical control and revolt in favor of a democracy, a positive form of the rule-by-many. The oligarchs lose control and the people themselves take the helm. Yet again, this framework degenerates. After democracy, we witness ochlocracy, which is a negative form of the rule-by-many. This is better known as “mob rule.” This is when the mob, which will be dissected in a later chapter, seizes control and ignores the previous laws, culture, and democratic institutions that ushered in their original freedom. The children of the revolutionary generations do not face the same struggles and become softened, which makes them entitled and weakened. As mob rule continues to dissolve the nation-state, a strong man enters to seize control by promising order to the dysfunctional country. Thus, ushering in monarchy and bringing us to the beginning of this list.

While we agree with the general theme, we disagree on the direction and the specific governments. Obviously, monarchies are no longer a dominating governmental form, so focusing on them is a moot point. Likewise, three hundred years from now, the specific government forms are likely to be far different in title. Which is why it is appropriate to solely refer to them by their “rule-by” types. This encompasses all government names, titles, and differences in the appropriate buckets to describe anacyclosis. A positive rule-by-many turns into a negative rule-by-many, which collapses into a rule-by-few, and so forth. So, there still exist a total of six regimes, with three positive variants and three negative ones. We refer to these as “positive stage” and “negative stage”, respectively.[xxvii] Any instances of a rule-by-none are transitional periods and are not a specific stage of anacyclosis.

Additionally, it appears as though typically it does not go from one -> few -> many as Polybius noted. Rather, the general direction is many -> few -> one.

A rule-by-many must degrade into a rule-by-few. Some power in the state must become component centralized before a rule-by-one can be achieved. A state cannot go from component decentralization into a situation where everything is centralized. The rule-by-many must degenerate through centralization into a rule-by-few over time. The pathway must follow power centralization.

A rule-by-few likewise must degenerate into a rule-by-one. When a state is component centralized, there is no way for it to revert to the decentralization of a rule-by-many. The only way this can occur is if absolute centralization arrives and smashes the component centralization. The centralized components in a rule-by-few can only degrade when absolute centralization forces them all under one fist. This could be done through revolution, as Polybius stated, but he is missing the middle step, which is a strongman who smashes the component centralization into pieces by using his absolute centralization. A few can never go to pure decentralization without this step because either the people or the strongman must have absolute centralization to do so, meaning that they do not have component centralization. This is why it must follow this exact linear path.

Now, for our rule-by-one exception. The rule-by-one, because of its absolute centralization status, is not linear. Rule-by-one is the stage with the most flexibility because of its absolute centralization. The exact point of absolute centralization presents a potential break in the cycle, similar to that of the rule-by-none. There are many examples of a rule-by-one -> rule-by-few, which is likely where Polybius got the original trend from. The rule-by-one can go to either the rule-by-few or the rule-by-many. This is because the absolute centralization of a state can be broken up into its component pieces or fully decentralized at the whims of the absolutist, who holds all the power to do either. Or, if he is weak, he can be taken over by the few or the masses in the same examples Polybius gives. So, a rule-by-one is a unique spot on anacyclosis, being the only point that does not follow a linear path and can go anywhere.

But the rule-by-many will always degrade into a rule-by-few, and the rule-by-few will always degrade into a rule-by-one.

This exception means that a rule-by-few -> rule-by-one -> rule-by-few internal cycle could occur within anacyclosis. It is rare, however, as usually the rule-by-many breaks through at some point relatively soon. The public is usually involved and forces the hand of the absolutist or becomes it.

Another point of disagreement with the original theories is that it is not always the case that a rule-by-one falls because of tyranny. In fact, this rarely seems to happen. Instead, the rule-by-one often degrades because of corruption. The one does not adequately curtail the corruption of his minions, typically because he is no longer an adequate leader himself. This results in an inefficient, degenerate, and pathetic government: one that is ripe for being overtaken. A prosperous, efficient, and tyrannical government is far harder to overcome than a decadent, inefficient one. This appears to be a contributing factor to why a rule-by-one has the special ability of being able to degrade to either a rule-by-few or a rule-by-many. Because of the absolute centralization, it is simply a result of who takes the power when the leader fails. If there is enough coordination among the few, they can strip the one of his power and achieve component centralization in a coup or similar strategy (rule-by-few). Likewise, the one can willingly break this power up into component pieces (rule-by-few) if he does so in an effective manner. However, the one also has the power to decentralize everything, removing power temporarily from all centralizers (rule-by-many). Sometimes, the many attack all the centralizers, including the one who then cannot respond appropriately. Sustainment of the centralized frameworks is more about the efficiency of the state, rather than the tyranny of it.

No matter how we look at this, it’s clear that when there is absolute centralization, we’ve reached a point of peak transitory power. This transition can lead anywhere. Under our view, it can also lead us out of the cycle entirely if used appropriately. Instead of being used as a decentralization or component centralization tool, it could be used as a tool to set up a framework resistant to the decaying elements of the legacy frameworks altogether.

This recognition of the special position of the rule-by-one is very important later on. To break the cycle, a transitional rule-by-one would likely be required because of its ability to be the ultimate catalyst for anacyclosis change. The other forms transition in very linear paths, whereas the rule-by-one is not chained by that protocol.

As a final note, in contrast to Polybius and other historical writers, we do not necessarily believe that each framework must employ its positive and negative stages. The positive regimes do not necessarily have to be expressed during anacyclosis. This mostly applies when the rule-by-many is included in the descent considerations. A degenerative rule-by-many could decline into a degenerative rule-by-few, for example. There does not appear to be any evidence that the positive variants need to be expressed after a degenerative rule-by-many has already been reached. Usually, if rule-by-many is not involved, the rule-by-few and rule-by-one will demonstrate these positive and negative regimes according to Polybius. However, when a rule-by-many is involved, it can cause a “permanent” negative variant to run across the entire cycle. Which is also why some of the rule-by-many forms can be the most damaging to the national people. A positive rule-by-many will degrade into a negative rule-by-many, which can degrade into a negative rule-by-few, which can degrade into a negative rule-by-one (if the centralizers continue to centralize in a linear manner against the interests of the citizens and no populist strongman arises to correct it at any stage). No nation is guaranteed a positive variant when playing with a rule-by-many. They must work for it. The national soul likely plays a large role in if they receive one.

Still, a rule-by-many deteriorates into a rule-by-few in modern times, which leads toward the violence that eventually deteriorates to a rule-by-one. The rule-by-few just does not look like what it used to in history. Instead of being noticeable as an aristocracy or other pockets of centralization within the state, it is usually a corrupt oligarchy or an elitism system masquerading as a rule-by-many. The centralizers make it seem as though a rule-by-many exists when it doesn’t. This may have been even more easily hidden in Polybius’s time, explaining some of the deviation in theory. Or, we may just be more fortunate with far more data points to look back on and study with ease. Either way, we still have a rule-by-few, even if we don’t call it as such.

Three of these frameworks work in the interest of the common man (positive regime variants). While the other three degenerative frameworks work in the interest of a select group at the expense of the common man (negative regime variants). The principal theme to take away from our theory of this effect is that all six forms are undesirable because they are all untenable long term. Why would you support one if you know that it will naturally degrade into another given a brief stint of time? Even if you can get the positive variant for a while, it won’t last forever. Even if you profit off of it, your descendants will suffer.

Now, what is our theory on the path that each framework follows? What is the cycle of collapse for each of our three frameworks, rule-by-one, rule-by-few, and rule-by-many? Assuming they follow a normal cycle of collapse (i.e., they begin with a positive form and then progress to the negative form).

The rule-by-one regime generally begins with a benevolent, intelligent leader. They can have as many systems as varied as the personalities of the dictators. What we do know is that eventually a single malicious or ineffective leader will seize control. The descendants of the initial leader will exhibit a regression to the mean, new internal infighting will evolve to the worst receiving the helm, or some other factor will play in that results in absolute power being in the wrong hands. This leads to the degenerative state, which follows the exact path noted by the ancients, resulting in the anacyclosis transition.

Now, on to the rule-by-few. This rule is notorious for following the same path as the rule-by-one. Originally, notable aristocrats lead the country to great heights in the positive stages. Eventually, as time passes, these aristocrats become corrupted and apathetic toward their constituents. They begin infighting for more power among one another to out-control the other centralizers. They all seek further power through absolute centralization. This leads to the revolt of the masses or the acquiring of that absolute centralization by one of their few. If popular revolt occurs, a rule-by-one arrives in a triumphant populist manner with a strongman. If centralizer-owned mob revolt or the few consolidation occurs, a rule-by-one arrives in a further degeneration manner with a final winning centralizer. Either way, the components are all pulled together into one absolute centralized power structure.

This is how centralization moves the cycle forward. This is why it is wise to view anacyclosis in the rule-by-many -> rule-by-few -> rule-by-one pathway, as it showcases the centralization problem in its very demonstration. The cycle is simply changes in centralization. The distribution of power is altered.

It is important to understand that in the transition from rule-by-many to the rule-by-few, the centralizers will work together to centralize their power. However, after they have that centralization, they will be forced to fight among themselves for further power because much of it has already been component centralized. To get more power, they have to fight among their own ruling-class comrades. They may work together while bringing the original collapse of a rule-by-many, but they never reach a level of power where they are all fulfilled. The lust for more never ends. Just as it drives the rule-by-many into the ground, it drives their own power system into the ground equally voraciously. It is an essential reason holes form in the rule-by-few, leading to a rule-by-one.

We will spend a longer time on the rule-by-many. The rule-by-many form’s cycle has already been partially demonstrated by this point, and our theory does not differ from the ancients. But we do change the focus to centralization. A summarization is that the people weaken, allowing the decentralized environment to be stolen from them.

To solve anacyclosis, we have to look at the exact method our base model degrades and then correct it. Thus, we focus on the first stage in our anacyclosis model. Where that model is: (1) rule-by-many (component decentralization); (2) rule-by-few (component centralization); and (3) rule-by-one (absolute centralization).

The rule-by-many framework collapses because the decentralized nature declines into centralization. Every societal ill, moral degeneracy, and failure of the system is an expression of this centralization. The distribution of power and control within the state gradually becomes component centralized. It becomes the tool of a newly formed ruling class that continually and relentless push for even more centralization. The key to understanding the downfall of a rule-by-many is to understand how this distribution has changed.

In all cases of decline, note how the centralization of power and control shifts. Power and control leave the hands of the accountable state and her people into the hands of the mob. Or, the power is stolen by a ruling class. This mutation rarely happens quick. A few decentralized component pieces are lost here and there over time. If it happened overnight, it would be too obvious. But a slow takeaway is pain free and hidden.

This is the primary issue. If unaccountable individuals get hold of these elements or have the ability to alter the law in such a way as to remove societal oversight, with no way for the contributors to reign them in, a rule-by-few is inevitable given enough time. Therefore, the objective is to prevent any form of centralization by any centralizers that are not accountable to the contributors in the nation. Everything should be fully accountable, so even if they do attempt to centralize it, they will fail. Additionally, another objective is to prevent any group or individual from changing the manner by which these elements are distributed in the society to keep the “decentralized” elements exactly as they exist in the beginning. We need a form of absolute centralization, but not for a one.

Historically, people feared the state. Yet this is not the primary threat in the rule-by-many world. In fact, the state is only the threat in certain rule-by-few and rule-by-one frameworks. In a positive rule-by-many, the masses direct the state. The problem is not the state, but that this state is too weak to protect the rest of the country and its institutions from centralization. In a positive rule-by-many framework, the real threat comes from those outside of the state that are trying to centralize power, which will later allow them to seize control of the state alongside their already overwhelming institutional power.

One of the modern ways this degeneration to centralization occurs is by cultural markers in the society. For example, cultural institutions become infiltrated and indoctrinate citizens into following the desired path of the ruling class. Or the isolated class buy off these cultural institutions and force their own desired “culture” on the masses.

Centralization can occur from a variety of negative societal actors besides just the government. We target four centralizer groups. all of which were previously mentioned: the financial arena centralizer (isolated class), cultural arena centralizer (SCM), intellectual arena centralizer (intelligentsia), and political arena centralizer (politburo). The political centralizer (a segment of the state) is but one small example of the centralizers, and in a decentralized rule-by-many are rarely the leading group. Not until the state nears the rule-by-few do they begin to play a larger role. But people still fear the state over any other arena. Even though all centralization is harmful when considering the cycle of collapse in a majority decentralized (rule-by-many) form of government.

For example, if the cultural arena centralizer secures the entire means of cultural proliferation, means of the media, and means of information distribution, what could they then not centralize? At that point, they are infinitely more powerful than the host rule-by-many state because they have the ability to unaccountably influence the thoughts and actions of the nation to the point where the state is merely their puppet through the indoctrination of the masses. They would also control most of the narratives, the politicians, and the ability to block any dissemination of contrary information.

The modern fight for freedom from the cycle is not just the struggle of the people against the state, but of the people against all forms of subversive centralization. Once we realize this, we realize the entire anti-state worldview we were taught is wrong. The state is merely a shell; it is not a boogeyman. In the rule-by-many framework, there are far more worrisome agents. All arenas contribute to collapse.

The cycle of collapse is also why the certain philosophies always seem to eventually fail. For example, the libertarian view of governance would never work in the long term.[xxviii] Libertarianism offers a solution against the state’s form of centralization but leaves the door wide open for every other centralization-demanding agent. The same goes for any type of anarchist philosophy. Those philosophies are right to argue that under their ideology the state may not be able to bring about the collapse. But the completely unhinged sensitive cultural markers, unaccountable isolated class, or the mob sure could bring about that collapse just as easily. The inverse of this thought is true as well: a rule-by-one advocate (such as a communist or fascist) merely desires to hand over all centralization to one agent. This will never work out in our own interests in the long term either, as history clearly corroborates.

The cycle of collapse has an annoying habit of forcing nearly every proponent of modern political theories to be humbler about their offerings. It likewise demands that nearly every modern political philosophy be rejected because, at their core, they will all fail. This makes it very difficult to find friends and allies when you’re spreading the truth of this situation.

To correct the cycle of collapse, we then have to look much further beyond traditional modes of thinking. It is not just the state that we need to fear when confronting the cycle, especially when considering our model framework. They are one arena, but they are far from the only important one. We have to focus on balancing the power of centralization with those who are most able to wield it justly.

Both anacyclosis and the cycle of collapse are necessary tools in understanding where we are currently and where we are heading as a nation. We believe there is an instinctive understanding of the cycle of collapse that all people know of but cannot name. As culture declines, trust in the state falters. As states decline, apathy in politics rises. The citizens believe that any chance of resistance is futile and resort to “dropping out” or becoming nonparticipants instead of activists for change; they recognize that as centralization increases, the chance of peaceful political change is effectively nonexistent.

Apathy is an issue because it rises promptly in degenerative systems and does so primarily because the men and women of the society instinctively, perhaps on a biological level, understand the cycle of collapse. We all understand our current frameworks cannot possibly survive.

They know they can’t change or fix the broken society from within. Maybe they don’t see every stage of collapse, but they know that this system is unsustainable. Thus, they surrender. This is an incredibly important effect because apathy is a direct contributor to the rise of demagogues and tyrants. These leaders will do whatever they need to do to stay in power, including nearly any form of bad or nationally damaging behavior.[xxix] If the majority are apathetic, it means they can do whatever they desire. Apathy is beneficial to them. It is also a necessary component of anacyclosis itself, especially for the first descent of the rule-by-many. We believe if more people know about anacyclosis and are educated on how it operates, they will naturally become more resilient toward it.

During the initial stages of the rule-by-many, there is often acceptable leadership. Usually, the leaders include some of the best the nation has to offer. Then, during the middle years, the leaders are as average as the average citizen. During the decadent years, the leaders are not just bad, but evil. If humanity is said to live on a spectrum of good to evil, then as time progresses on the cycle of collapse, the leadership of the nation moves right alongside that character spectrum. Exceptions occur but are rare. The citizenry often follows similar patterns.

At its root, the rule-by-many falls because the vanguards that exist to protect the decentralized system are weakened to a point that the few can overcome them. This is done at the direction of the few, slowly over time, using the centralization of certain societal arenas. The vanguards can be weakened by the wealth of the isolated class, the cultural distortion of the SCMs, or the misinformation of the intelligentsia. Usually, it’s by a combination of all three. Once this happens, it is often noticed that the few use a degenerative mob to drive the country firmly into the hands of the few. The few control the mob and use it to promote fear, apathy, and a desire for order in the masses, which they use to component centralize. This mob is the final tool used by the centralizers and is the most damaging asset against the vanguards.

There are a lot of reasons why the rule-by-many cannot sustain itself. These are but a few to add to the growing list we have presented in this book.

The legacy rule-by forms are not all that different. For instance, the rule-by-one form falls because the one is changed from a good soul to a bad soul, causing the initial degeneration to occur. The rule-by-few is the same, but with a group. Even further, the rule-by-many is also no different, but with the full masses. Once that national soul degrades from its higher form, the descent begins. The only difference is that the rule-by-many form is degraded purposefully by the centralizers, whereas the centralized rule-by variants are organically shifted.

At its most bare form, the cycle of collapse is about a spiritual collapse of a people. The theorists who postulate economic[xxx], political[xxxi], biological[xxxii], moral[xxxiii], or other causes of collapse are recognizing the physical, visible effects of the process of the fall—Not the true cause. The true cause is a lost national soul from a previously successful and spirited nation.

This realization is simple but imperative: If you can see or study a physical ailment, then the decline is already occurring. The true collapse must have already started before the physical component is even noticeable. The physical symptom cannot be the illness, because it is the visible symptom. Something else had to have already degenerated to allow that physical illness to rise to the surface enough for us to see it.

The origin of the decline is thus found in the national soul. The system (or in this case, systems) and biological component can only change if the soul degrades first. There is a spiritual nature to all things that lead the physical. For instance (using our list of economic, political, biological, and moral arguments in descending order):

• The collective soul of the people must be changed to a more wicked version to shift the functional morality, which we can then see with declining rates of religiosity and changing moral positions.
• The collective soul of the men must be weakened to an effeminate and apathetic condition to allow migrants to flood in with no pushback, altering the biological reality of the citizenry.
• The collective soul must be subjugated or made to feel inferior to permit bad leaders instead of harshly dealing with them.
• The collective soul must be made greedy, covetous, abundant, and/or entitled to allow the economic environment to be corrupted with improper incentives, which then present changes that can be quantifiably studied.

Nation-states start the decline with the soul of their people. Their collective soul is altered from what it once was, regardless of the unique conditions (biology, heritage, blood, and so on) that built it in the first place. This soul then degenerates through various mechanisms, which is what produces the beginning of the political collapse of nations and states.

Everything else is a physical ailment—a noticeable symptom—of this bedrock collapse. The people’s own spiritual nature itself changes. Our soul is more than just beliefs, goals, desires, mindset, outlook, faith, trust, hopes, understanding of the world, feelings, intellect, and on and on. It is the animating force that directs us. It encompasses and expands off of each of these particular characteristics of the heart, mind, and spirit.

George MacDonald, a Scottish author, once said: “You don’t have a soul. You are a Soul. You have a body.” The exact same applies for nation-states. A nation does not have a soul. The nation is a soul. They have a state, governing systems, biology, country, et cetera. Just like how you grow, evolve, and change, so to do nation-states. But the inverse is true as well: since we can devolve, so can nation-states.

Just like humans, this is not a linear line. The more degenerate the nation is, the faster we fall even further. It increases as the condition gets worse.

The national collapse starts with the spirit and ends with the physical results. Until more people recognize this, they will keep being led astray by secular materialist theories. Trying to cure or prevent one physical symptom (economics, biology, morality, etc.) will do nothing to stop the degeneration of the soul. The collapse will still occur, just using different pathways. This is as true for the rule-by-many as it is for the other frameworks. No matter anything else, the system that can keep its soul within its proper position for the longest will sustain the longest.

Given this information, our task is then to create a system that allows the national soul to permanently maintain its animating force, as that soul is the “first among equals” within the Three Essentials.

But for now, let us turn our attention back to historical accounts of the cycle of collapse and anacyclosis.

We can see the effect of anacyclosis throughout numerous regions in history. All regions and countries of the world have witnessed this cycle. Regretfully, we cannot investigate each of these examples as thoroughly as they deserve. An entire book could be written on just a couple of these examples and their connection to anacyclosis and the cycle of collapse. But we do not have the time nor the space necessary to do so within this text. Instead, we provide a summary and encourage further study. Does our theory match historical reality? Let us consider many different regions, time periods, and nationalities to test our belief.

Consider first the popular example of the decline of Rome. The Roman world began under a form of tribalism. These component centralized tribes eventually grew and consolidated into a kingdom. The Roman Republic was then formed after throwing off the shackles of the centralized Roman Kingdom.[xxxiv] It then became one of the most influential republics in history. Notwithstanding the obvious legacy framework issues, however. This republic eventually decayed into the Roman oligarchy as a corrupt few centralized power. The peasants lost nearly all of their land in favor of the aristocrats that had turned corrupt. After continual internal strife from the rule-by-few rulers for further hegemony, the republic fell, and Rome had their first emperor: Caesar. He rose due to a populist revolt against the rule-by-few hierarchy. Starting with the Kingdom, we witness a rule-by-one -> rule-by-many -> rule-by-few -> rule-by-one in Rome’s case. Rome would later demonstrate our rule-by-one exception numerous times during its Empire years as power was lost to component centralization and then reconsolidated at various periods.

Now consider Italy. Following the fall of the Roman Empire, much of the Italian region splintered. Significant chunks of the region eventually succumbed to a form of monarchy or similar rule-by-one governmental form. Others went to rule-by-few. After monarchy in the eleventh century, they returned to city-states under a republic-type system. But that, too, declined over time, given the usual trends of centralization of power. Again, this was a rule-by-one -> rule-by-many -> rule-by-few -> rule-by-one. Now let’s fast forward to more recent Italian history. Italy transitioned to the fascist Mussolini regime during the World War II timeframe. After fascism collapsed in Italy, the government took up a “Christian Democracy” system. Now, it is slowly degenerating yet again to a rule-by-few from their original rule-by-many system. Which is a rule-by-one -> rule-by-many -> rule-by-few.

Other governments change more quickly. Consider Venezuela, which we mentioned in the preceding chapter. Venezuela had a history of dictatorship to republic following after the Spanish colonization. From 1908 to 1935, it was the world’s largest oil exporter under a dictatorship. They oscillated between military rule and democratic rule until 1958. A transitional government was installed in 1958 that marked the return of democracy. Later, in 1973, Venezuela began doing phenomenally well economically. Sadly, after this boom, they nationalized key industries such as oil and steel (rule-by-few). In 1989, their economy experienced the first of its many collapses. In 1998, Hugo Chavez took office, and Venezuela officially entered a rule-by-one. Fast forward to the more recent year (2019) and the economy was in full collapse with their leader Maduro refusing to hand over power to the democratically elected leader Guaido, effectively creating a degenerative totalitarian state. Their history demonstrates our theory of anacyclosis and the cycle of collapse repeatedly over short durations of time, even going so far as showcasing the component centralization by the isolated class and politburo that occurred in their oil and gas industry.

Or we could discuss the interesting case of Zimbabwe, where one individual endured through the entire cycle. Robert Mugabe paved the way for independence (rule-by-many) from colonialism (rule-by-one) in Zimbabwe, becoming the country’s first president. His lifelong love of socialism led him to create socialistic economic policies, effectively making him a socialist leader under a rule-by-few as he component centralized certain aspects of the state. His socialist economic policies caused massive food shortages, which led to him having to use an iron fist to stay in power, enacting a rule-by-one. He eventually forewent honorable elections in favor of being a dictator under rigged elections until he retired. After retirement, the country held general republic-style elections. It’s likely still rigged to some extent, but they’ve made progress decentralizing from the dictatorship already. Truly, Zimbabwe is an interesting case study due to its ability to witness the entire cycle within one president’s tenure.

While on the topic of Africa, it is helpful to explain how the rule-by-many form can vary based on biological differences. When most Western readers would think of a rule-by-many, they would picture free-for-all voting and unlimited “freedoms.” This does not have to be the case, however. In our definition of a rule-by-many, it is only that the majority of the population has power through decentralization, leading toward a decentralized structure of government. This could be found in the tribal lands in much of Africa, prior to state centralization. The different African nations may not have all had democratic institutions or “freedoms,” as we would call them, but the majority had a say in their community, and power was component decentralized. Thus, representation occurred within the overall nation. It wasn’t until centralization began occurring and one tribe dominated the others through the use of force that this changed. Many African nations have not had success with democratic institutions but have had clear instances of rule-by-many forms during their culturally unique history. They just do so according to their own unique ethnicity and nation, which is expected. Other regions, such as the Middle East, share a similar pattern.[xxxv]

How about the Ottoman Empire? In 1550, it was functionally a dictatorship under a Sultan. By 1700, it had transformed to a multipower and multicultural empire with many nations under submission within. The Ottomans faced a democratization event in 1876 by the nationalist Young Turk Revolution and many other nationalist acts of resistance around that time, demonstrating further the weakness of multiculturalism and heterogeneity in the cohesion of centralized states. The Ottomans attempted to promote a unity of the empire, but it failed in the face of increasing nationalism of the empire’s independent nations. After their defeat and partition in World War I, many of the regions eventually turned to a republic-type rule-by-many framework or a rule-by-few. Now, many of the regions have fallen to monarchies under Islamic states or had already done so and have now transitioned back to quasi-republics.

What of Athens, the birthplace of democracy? Athens was plagued by a harsh aristocracy prior to its democratic leanings, where the many were enslaved by the few. The people rose against this “few,” over time becoming a mob. This led to the arrival of our first “one” figure, Solon, who held full centralization but laid the foundations for a limited Athenian democracy by implementing reforms meant to avert the decline in Athens through his code of law. Still, without enough safeguards, it was not long before the rule-by-few returned. Then, tyrants (Peisistratus) returned. The cycle repeated, tyranny fell again, and both Cleisthenes and the Ecclesia formed the rule-by-many framework of government in Athens. This Athenian democracy again fell rather rapidly due to the same pressures as other rule-by-many forms, first becoming a rule-by-few and then a rule-by-one. This cycle continued to repeat over time in the region. These small city-states were the ones our historical figures, such as Plato and Polybius, studied in depth. Sparta followed a similar rapid path.

Even further, we have the interesting case of the U.S. The United States was under British colonial rule (rule-by-one) until their secession from the British Empire created a republic. This republic is showing significant signs of decay into centralization such as the technocratic means of information control, expansion of the uniparty politburo, wealth centralization in a few corporates and individuals, and plenty of related instances that we will discuss later. The few control most of the power in the state. Therefore, as of this writing, it is solidly under the control of the rule-by-few. The U.S. demonstrates our anacyclosis pathway exception, wherein a degenerative rule-by-many can skip the positive variants during its decline. This state has clearly progressed from a positive rule-by-many, to a negative rule-by-many, to a negative rule-by-few, skipping the positive rule-by-few step that many ancients claim must occur. It will not be long until the U.S. reaches an even further degenerative rule-by-few stage and then returns to a rule-by-one.

China is also a unique example. Starting with the Qing Dynasty, the country gradually moved toward a rule-by-many from a rule-by-one (the dynasty). Toward the end of the Qing Dynasty, numerous elections were being held, even parliamentary elections. The Xinhua revolution then took place, which transformed the state into the Republic of China. This was meant to be a quintessential rule-by-many republic framework. China is unique in that even after this happened, the clear cyclical splinter between two similar entities can be witnessed. Centralization occurred rapidly on the mainland. The mainland quickly fell into a rule-by-few whose participants were in a constant struggle against one another. This eventually culminated in the rise of Mao and his form of rule-by-one communism and later an even tighter absolute rule-by-one centralization with the appearance of Xi Jinping. In Taiwan, however, the republic lived on in what was supposed to be its true form. One survived, while the other rapidly declined throughout the anacyclosis circle right back to absolute centralization. Two very similar nations with two diametrically opposed outcomes. But both followed anacyclosis and the cycle of collapse. The only difference was the timeline and the result of our rule-by-one exception. Regarding the latter, the rule-by-one fell to both a rule-by-few and a rule-by-many, within different regions.

How about a short walkthrough of modern Germany? They went from the Weimar Republic (rule-by-many -> rule-by-few) to National Socialist (rule-by-one). Then, half of them stayed within a rule-by-one behind the Berlin Wall under communism, and the other half returned to rule-by-many. After reunification, they have since moved on to a rule-by-many but are clearly entering into a degenerative stage of that particular rule as evidenced by their moral decay, immigration policies, and related factors. It is probable that many Germans would argue they have already entered a rule-by-few.

On the subject of communism, what of Cambodia? The Cambodians had a capitalistic form of democratic government (albeit still corrupt) that eventually decayed into an outright corrupt oligarchy. This corrupt oligarchy cleared the path for the Khmer Rouge to overtake the country and instill a dictatorial communist regime. Once the communists collapsed, mostly due to Vietnam’s invasion, the pathway for the return of the rule-by-many was opened. In 1993, elections were held and a rule-by-many returned. Cambodia utilized an elective constitutional monarchy similar to Malaysia, which is an even purer form of rule-by-many than a hereditary monarchy because the monarch is elected. However, many Cambodians would likely argue that Cambodia is rapidly entering a rule-by-few scenario. The Cambodian People’s Party is the main political party in the country and has secured the vast majority of the parliament, and allegations of voter fraud are widespread. In recent years, Cambodia has also banned the main political opposition party. Whether or not we define them as a rule-by-few as of now is irrelevant, the main takeaway is to recognize the centralization process that has been occurring. Cambodia demonstrates a rule-by-many to a rule-by-few, then to a rule-by-one, back to a rule-by-many, and then toward a rule-by-few yet again.

What about the recent situation in Portugal? After the assassination of the king and his eldest son in 1908, Portugal descended into civil strife for a couple of years. This culminated with the abdication of the new king amid a revolution, resulting in Portugal becoming a republic (rule-by-one to rule-by-many). Enlightenment sentiments kick in with sweeping modernity and even a separation of church and state. Not for long, however. In 1926, a military coup occurred (rule-by-many to rule-by-few). This eventually led to the infamous Salazar becoming “prime minister” in 1932 of a corporatist authoritarian government (rule-by-few to rule-by-one) that ruled until shortly after his death in 1970. Shortly thereafter, in 1982, the military council was abolished, and a rule-by-many returned in the form of a representative democratic republic (and still remains at the time of our writing).

Next up, Iran. After the Soviet withdrawal from Iran in the 1940s, Iran soon formed a united nation. It began humbly with a Middle Eastern–style rule-by-many form, championing a form of secular democracy under the prime minister. Later, after the Central Intelligence Agency backed a coup d’état, it increasingly became more authoritarian and centralized, transitioning as it did from a rule-by-many to a rule-by-few. As of this writing, the “republic” in the “Islamic Republic” is long since gone, instead being a clear-cut case of a rule-by-one Islamic-style monarchy. Iran follows a clear-cut progression that follows our theories: a rule-by-one (foreigners—Soviet control) fell to a rule-by-many, which quickly degraded into a rule-by-few, and culminated in a rule-by-one.

We could also look at the largest contiguous land empire in history, the Mongolian Empire. Heralded as the most dominating rule-by-one during the reign of Genghis Khan, it splintered after his death because of the inherent problems of rule-by-ones regarding proper succession of the “one” position. The empire further cracked as each independent region within the empire centralized authority away from the center, finalizing in the Khanates separating into four distinct empires. These regions continued to degenerate, and ultimately broke down into further regional splinters that took their own paths on the cycle of collapse. The overall post-Khan empire demonstrates our rule-by-one exception, going from a rule-by-one to a rule-by-few. Additionally, each of the Khanates demonstrated the rule-by-few to rule-by-one theory as they broke away.

French history is just as illuminating. In recent history, the French monarchy controlled the nation until the beginnings of a republic in 1789-1792. That is, until the reign of terror, which gradually centralized the state over the decade until Napoleon seized complete control in a rule-by-one. Eventually, this rule-by-one fell into the second republic in the mid-1800s. It did not last long due to rapid component centralization, and soon the second empire arose. But the theme doesn’t end here; I’m sure our reader can probably guess the progression at this point. This new empire also fell. With it, the third republic was born. Eventually, a rule-by-one returned in the form of domination by NSDAP Germany. After Germany’s defeat in World War II, the republic has since returned. They are now degrading into what will probably be a rule-by-few in the coming years. Modern French history proves the cycle numerous times over. However, each step of anacyclosis and the cycle was evident in France long before their national state founding. We already discussed Rome (which for a time controlled the territory of modern France) and Feudalist France, both of which also followed a similar centralization path as the modern national state of France.

How about the interesting case of Russia? Russia practiced feudalism for a significantly longer period than most other countries. While most abandoned feudalism in the Middle Ages, Russia had it as the primary form of government until well into the nineteenth century. During this time period, they often exhibited the rule-by-one exception (an internal repetitious rule-by-few to rule-by-one occurred). In 1861, they abandoned serfdom. Later on, the gateway opened for the communists to seize control during the Russian Revolution. This revolution trapped the Russians back into the stage of rule-by-one (rule-by-one to a very short rule-by-many to a rule-by-few to a rule-by-one). Since the fall of the rule-by-one USSR, the country has been a rule-by-many republic. Some would argue that the current Russian framework is now officially a rule-by-few under their politburo. Regardless, even if they are not yet, they will be eventually given the cycle.

Spain, Poland, Tunisia, Vietnam, Chile, and nearly every other country shares very similar stories to those just mentioned. We are practically just echoing the same thing repeatedly by going through each of these regions. But that is the point. The aim was to demonstrate that there is a trend here. Through this repetition, we can clearly see it. That trend is anacyclosis and a cycle of collapse that is clearly evident for all world governments. Regardless of location, demographics, nationality, religion, ethnicity, or any other usual exception. They all follow a similar tendency. There are exceptions to these tendencies, as with anything else, but they are rare and infrequent.

We have spoken for a region or country on every single continent besides Australia (excluded because it is a relatively new arrival) and Antarctica (excluded for the obvious reason of lack of civilization). Australia was discovered as recent as 1770, and the commonwealth was not even founded until 1901. They have largely been a democratically elected constitutional monarchy, which is why they have retained their culture for the time being much like the U.S. Republic and the Roman Republic. But evidence of decline has come to fruition in Australia the same as in other Western nations. One could easily argue that Australia is currently a rule-by-few, given their current state of affairs. At this point in history, they are not inspiring much optimism that they will be the exception to this rule.

If we had the resources, we would study every single country and their own cycles of collapse over the past two thousand years. The sheer number of civilizations and their complexities is far too great without an entire dedicated field of study, however. It takes months to truly grasp the entire circumstances of one single nation during one single period. Perhaps in the future we can fund such an excursion to help truly capture anacyclosis and the cycle of collapse for each independent state over time. A data synthesis project like this would surely lead us to even more interesting insights. (We encourage anyone with the curiosity to pursue this research idea.) Another avenue of study that would be of prime interest is the cycle of collapse not just for nations and states, but for the civilizations and civilizational periods that house them. Is there a cycle of collapse for Western Civilization overall, for example? Or only for the independent states? This is an interesting question to consider and hypothesize. This will require future study that is beyond the reach of this particular book.

We encourage the reader to research their own region’s and birthplace’s political history. Look up histories of countries you are interested in. Consider these histories through the lens of the cycle. You will see similar results. There are very few countries that escape the hourglass: we all reside under one of these failing frameworks. They just go by different names, government titles, and timelines.

These cycles happen everywhere. They are indifferent to genetic, cultural, religious, or geographic differences. They are ingrained into our societies and civilizations. Just like our natural inclination to sin must be constantly combatted against on a personal level, so too must we fight against the natural cycle of political regime change on a societal level. We must become better.

It is important to break here and note three specialized matters with our theory: the timeline issue, the exception issue, and the transition issue.

Firstly, the finalized timeline it takes from ascension to dust for a nation is far less important than the traits it exhibits during those timelines. Humanity is always exhibiting difference and change, so minor deviations are expected. Yet, if we know the periods and traits it exhibits during those uncertain timelines, we will have a better idea of trending a timeline using those verifiable points. This is why we don’t focus heavily on Sir Glubb’s 250-year hypothesis or other timeline-focused theories. We are much more concerned with the signals that indicate where we are at currently on the timeline to see how fast we are heading toward the same outcomes. No two countries would be exactly the same in timeline, but they are the same in traits of degeneration.

This timeline issue is easy to grasp when using the Baghdad example. Baghdad used to be a thriving city within a powerful empire during the tenth century. It was the largest city in the world at that time. Baghdad was the center of power during this Golden Age of Islam. Would you have expected the historians of Baghdad to have complained about the degeneracy they experienced there? The historians complained of sexual immorality, a constant creeping materialism, corruption of the state, financial centralizers, debauchery language, and even the equivalent of “pop” singers![xxxvi] Not only this, but Arabs became a minority in their own imperial capital due to immigration.[xxxvii] Do any of these ring true of degenerative nations of today? Most readers would never expect that the very same problem afflicting us also felled one of the most prominent Islamic cities of all time. Baghdad has never recovered its old prestige since. These degeneration expressions are more important to us than the duration of specific legacy frameworks. This is why the timeline of the decline is less important than what is actually happening internally. Because when you know what is happening internally, you will automatically recognize where a nation is on their personalized timeline.

Secondly, the exception issue. It is obvious, but it has to be said for the statistically uninformed: there are always exceptions to the general rule. This is true of nearly everything with humanity. In the case of the cycle of collapse, the exceptions are usually limited to small, ethnically and culturally homogeneous, moderate to high intelligence societies that have not achieved a heightened status of power and wealth that would rapidly lead to the affluence stage. Even then, these societies are still on the cycle; however, they are moving much slower due to those specific traits which allow them to resist degeneracy for longer. But those traits also put them at risk, as their small size risks foreign subversion or invasion and the lack of affluence promotes internal disorder. These exceptions, which could probably be counted on one hand, tend to have profited more on luck for their extended years than anything else.

Thirdly, the transition issue. All government frameworks have a “transition period” during anacyclosis when they are switching from one governmental framework to another. The transition from a rule-by-few to a rule-by-one does not happen overnight. There is a period that can demonstrate anomalies to the general anacyclosis trend, and this is called the transition period. We discuss the transition period from a rule-by-one to a rule-by-contributor in our transition period in a later chapter, but every anacyclosis transition shows one, not just ours. Sometimes these transitional periods are considered as steps in anacyclosis, but this would be faulty logic. For instance, after the successful rebellion against the British by the newly formed United States, George Washington and his revolutionaries were a de facto dictator and military junta. However, this was merely the transition period, where he used the centralization from the previous rule-by-one (foreign British rule) to implement a rule-by-many. It would not be logically correct to call the sequence a rule-by-one -> rule-by-one -> rule-by-many, because it leaves out the important step of transition. It was simply a rule-by-one -> rule-by-many with a normal transition. This is also why sometimes the rule-by-none is witnessed for very brief periods. It is not an anacyclosis stage, but rather part of the transitional period to the next framework. Make sure when researching you do not mistake the transitional periods for the actual stages of anacyclosis. Some will be actual stages, others will be transitions. It’s important to distinguish them by the purpose for which their period exists.

With these three few issues addressed we can move forward.

A key indicator of sustainability is the culture and the demographics. This is because the demographics are directly part of the Three Essentials (nation, soul, and system), and the culture is an expression of another. These two items drive what happens in society far more than the structure of their government. But the structure of the government determines the susceptibility and longevity of the aforementioned pieces. The reason government systems change is that the culture or the people change. A sound structure protects against this.

The only other instigator of why governments change (aside from culture, centralization, or demographics) would be external threats from foreigners or the economy. If people are united under a culture and have a promising life with some struggles to cause men to develop appropriately and no centralizers present, the government does not change. Once one of those factors shifts, however, the hourglass starts pouring. In correcting this cycle, we must focus on each of these pieces with a zealous attitude.

While the hourglass comparison in the previous chapter was a helpful instruction, we also want to introduce our anacyclosis diagram using our model. Picture a circle with three points equally spaced apart, with the first point at the uppermost region of the circle. We call this point A. Point A is rule-by-one (absolute centralization). Point B is rule-by-many (decentralized). Finally, point C is rule-by-few (component centralized). See the following diagram showing this:

Every legacy government framework and system are located on this circle. Constantly moving clockwise (note the arrows on the image). The rule-by-one exception is shown by the internal triangle connecting the three frameworks, indicating that it has the power of skipping the traditional pathway but is still limited to residing within the circle.

The space between each rule-by form is that preceding form’s cycle of collapse. For example, the distance between the rule-by-many and the rule-by-few is the cycle of collapse for the rule-by-many.

The first half of the distance between two points indicates the positive or beneficial version of that preceding regime. The latter half is the degenerative stage. If the positive stage is skipped during anacyclosis, we could assume our point on the circle jumps immediately to the latter half once reaching a new stage.

This diagram is helpful to visualize that, as the rule-by forms end, it is not an immediate transition. For example, as a rule-by-one ends, it does not immediately jump to pure component decentralization. It takes time. Slowly or rapidly, it drops its aspects of centralization. Just the same as the rule-by-many forms slowly lose their decentralized nature when transitioning into a rule-by-few.

Because of the power of centralization, the cycle can move much faster according to those who are in charge. This is for both component centralized and absolute centralized forms. They can choose to speed it up far faster than what is generally noticeable during the decentralized stages. Since the alternative is decentralized, it cannot be manipulated in such a manner until some centralization occurs.

As mentioned, we can use this diagram to track where each government currently resides on their own cycle of collapse. We implore the reader to ponder where their own state currently resides on this cycle and in relation to anacyclosis.

This visual representation also helps explain the interconnectivity of political governance. Rarely is a country truly one hundred percent centralized or decentralized. Nor are they one hundred percent capitalist, socialist, democratic, or any political catch-phrase. They are a mix, dependent on their placement on this circle. The only consistent piece is that they never stop moving along it.

Sometimes, as in the case of Venezuela or Zimbabwe, the government swiftly moves along the cycle. Other times, like with many well-designed empires, it gets dragged out.

We can also use this to understand the difference between the “conservative” and “progressive” positions. While certain nations can have different definitions of these terms, we will use the U.S. political arena regarding the conservative versus progressive movement definitions. Conservatives desire to conserve a single spot on this circle. As the nation progresses along the circle, the spot they need to hold shifts. They no longer want to conserve the original foundational beliefs as they are far too distant a possibility to preserve. This is why young conservatives argue for things that the conservatives of decades prior would faint at the thought of. Similarly, this is why over time the conservatives themselves become the progressives of the past. The progressives push forward on the circle, whereas the conservatives want to hold it at an arbitrary line. Eventually, the conservatives are forced to hold the line at the position the previous progressives were pushing for. Think of it as a small block along the circle. The conservatives want to hold the tail end of the block, while the progressives simply push the block forward. The near end point of the block is then further along with the degeneration. Sadly, the best a conservative can do is slightly delay the inevitable. Even if the conservative could “conserve”, what exactly would they be conserving besides a failing, degenerate system that is wholly unworthy of their time or commitment?

What is perhaps most ironic is that the progressives are pushing to “progress” back to a preceding governmental form. It is far more aptly referred to as regression than progression, but the meaning would be lost to them. They are, in effect, pushing power directly into the hands of centralizers unless they are residing at a rule-by-one stage. They have been indoctrinated by the same individuals that profit off of their lack of historical understanding. It is a strongly delusion position. There is no linear process where we continue to “go forward,” instead we only continue to rotate in the same cyclical movement.[xxxviii]

Both the actions of the conservatives and the progressives benefit the centralizers. The progressives, for obvious reasons, and the conservatives because of their necessitation for continual reconsideration of where they will hold the line (moving further along the cycle as needed).

The useful idiot nature of the progressive is not surprising in the least, given historical trends. There is always a class of well-meaning, slightly higher-educated individuals that will blindly fight for what they are instructed is morally correct. They are often emotionally driven, so neither the logic and rationality acquired from historical study nor intellect will correct their course. What is surprising is the conservative. The conservative, even during their descent, either outright rejects the knowledge from history or is not self-aware enough to recognize that it is happening to them. Instead, they continually attempt to play catchup from the progressive’s movements. They will continually move their “conserved” point at the whims of the progressives, barely putting up a fight as it accelerates. They have no one to blame but themselves, because conservative types are not locked out of political influence during the degeneration period. In fact, in many cases they are granted sweeping political power by the masses who desire strong action to fix the progressive degeneration. Conservatives are often elected en masse by the public to stop the decline. Instead of taking strong and harsh measures to do so once elected, they often appease their enemy and become complacent when granted these positions. By not using their strategic positions when acquired, they are solely slowing down the rate at which they are consumed. The only way to stop the progressive push is to act harshly. But in doing so, it would require certain strong centralized elements to be used that the conservatives despise out of principle or would require making enemies with the centralizers in the politburo (which they rarely want to do because those are their colleagues). The conservative leaders in position to correct the continual decline are closer to the centralizers than they are to the average national people. Which is why nothing can ever be done to resolve the decline by the conservative party. The conservatives, being rendered to little more than a minor speedbump on the path to a recycling of historical “progress,” read properly as regress, do little to resolve the coming annihilation of themselves and their constituents.

This is why both the conservative and progressive party are worthless in the long run in preventing the deterioration of a rule-by-many. They both lead to the same end result, albeit differing in speed of arrival. The only entity that could stop the end result is a party that denies the rule-by-many framework’s decentralization and shares no interest in cooperating with centralizers for personal gain. Both of those conditions are required, or the effort demonstrated by the party would ultimately be useless. Unsurprisingly, if a party demonstrated both characteristics, they would likely be banned, infiltrated, or heavily targeted by the dominant parties within the nation. They would also need to push centralization of their own kind. Such is the dilemma: the current parties will not support the people, but the people have zero ability to create an alternative mainstream party that would. Political action that results in desirable change is centralized in the interest of the politburo centralizers who do not desire a change to their ruling ability. The politburo, both conservative and progressive, benefits when centralization increases.

You can also note that as the circle moves further clockwise, the political discourse changes. As time progresses, the centralizers seize far more power and have far more tools at their disposal to push for more centralization. The tools, institutions, and culture can be used as weapons to increase the speed of the centralization. Since the distance is not as far from fully fledged component centralization compared to the past, it is much easier for them to use these in a nefarious manner.

We also would like to present another simple visual diagram with the rare rule-by-one exception included here:

This demonstrates the exact sentiments as the above, but with a clearer inclusion of the rare rule-by-one -> rule-by-few exception. Both are included so that our reader can choose the one they are most comfortable with to recall for future reference.

Before moving forward, we should also address old theories pertaining to the political spectrums. Generally, individuals on the right of the political spectrum are trying to “conserve” their spot on the cycle while those on the left desire to advance it. There is a common belief in the U.S. that there is a political pendulum that swings right and left with time. This isn’t fully accurate. While the political fighting noted by the circle may shift here and there, it will not move backward. While it may be nudged back and forth occasionally, it’s only moving back so far as the current zone allows it. It would never return to a truly traditional position.

Think of a zone as a small area on the cycle of collapse. Picture a government at a random point on the anacyclosis circle and then add just a short distance both behind this point and in front of it. This would be the “zone” on the cycle. There are potentially hundreds of zones in between two different forms, or as little as only a handful of zones, depending on the speed of the decline. Each zone allows for a certain level of back-and-forth for some victories from either side, but it is not possible to return to a previous zone. This is why it is impossible to move back. Rather, any victories for conservationists only delay the progression of the current zone for the time being.[xxxix]

Centralizers use the pendulum lie to placate the conservative and install fear in the progressive. But once the zone itself moves forward, it is stuck there, never to return to the prior one. The fight is then keeping it in its current zone or getting it to progress to the next zone. The only real question is the speed at which we will move on the circle. If the pendulum goes right, it will just slow this progression for a set amount of time within the zone until it swings back left. The pendulum does not truly exist, except if considered in this micro scale as a zone during the cycle of collapse.

In describing political allegiances, there is another old theory called the “horseshoe” theory. It states that the far left and the far right are not at the opposite ends of a linear political spectrum. Instead, they closely resemble one another, similar to how the opposite ends of a horseshoe are close together. This theory is directly correlated with our circular theory here (albeit admittedly reductionist). For example, both communists and national socialists would fall into the same section: the forms desiring absolute centralization. They are both similar in their framework of government, even if they initially seem quite different. They both desire a return to rule-by-one through centralization. It is why our regimes are not separated based on political ideology but based on the power source. This theory also explains why fringe ideologies are appealing under certain intersocietal conditions. A positive, benevolent rule-by-one is far superior to the majority of the citizenry than a degenerate rule-by-many or similar. What differing individuals may consider a benevolent rule-by-one is the point of contention, not the desire of wanting a “one”. However, the horseshoe theory does not take into consideration the differences in outcome and practices of the systems of the rule-by-one form, and that is an important distinction. To completely ignore the system is foolish.

These two theories, the horseshoe and political pendulum theories, aren’t particularly useful in terms of the cycle of collapse, but they needed clarification, considering their widespread usage. When you study systems and frameworks with the terms we use, it changes a lot of preconceived beliefs and discredits many “mainstream” beliefs, especially theories such as these.

Considering the cycle of collapse, which framework is the deadliest? After careful long-term analysis, it is my assumption that there is no framework as destructive as a degenerative rule-by-many. Even the more centralized systems (rule-by-few or rule-by-one) generally cause less permanent damage to the long-term survivability of the nation or their soul. In many ways, a degenerative rule-by-few or rule-by-one forces a preservation of the national soul in the subjugated people as they resist, either physically or spiritually. The rule-by-many does the opposite. The centralized variants are often deadly to the current populations, certainly. But the degenerative form of the rule-by-many is deadly to the entire generational line that comes after it. Think of it as a virus: one kills only a few select hosts while the other kills the hosts and permanently mutates their entire genetic line. Both are damaging and should be avoided, but one is far worse than the other.

The degenerative form of the rule-by-many damages the soul of the subjects and the very soul of the nation. The people themselves are degraded in the interest of centralization. This soul, once lost, can rarely be recovered after the fact. It makes the former nation a mere shadow of its former powerful self. The descendants of the present generation will not look like them, act like them, think like them, believe like them, and will more than likely hate them and all they have ever accomplished. Even the degenerative forms of centralized variants such as fascism and communism cannot facilitate this complete annihilation tactic. China is still inhabited by Chinese and Russia by the Russians. Germans were Germans and French were French after the World War until the arrival of the degenerate forms of the modern rule-by-many. Now, in how many years will it be until the original population is a minority in their own nations? Will their culture survive? Their beliefs? Their millennia-long legacies? Almost certainly not, unless the course is changed very soon.

Many of the atrocities committed during rule-by-ones are only made possible because of the destruction of the national soul during the rule-by-many descent. The decline of the nation during the rule-by-many sets up the conditions and environment necessary for evil to proliferate during further anacyclosis changes. If the people and their soul did not change during this time, would the rule-by-few and rule-by-one be so harsh? We do not believe so, given that there are instances of benevolent rule-by-few and rule-by-ones because they are kept in check by a population with a proper soul. But these are only evident when the rule-by-many does not decline catastrophically. A significant amount of the future depends on what occurs during the ending years of the rule-by-many. That provides the key to uncovering where the nation is headed during their anacyclosis journey.

The rule-by-many forms end like this because of their skewed incentivization tactics and centralizers. Centralizers provide a starting point for future descent. The nations grow to hate themselves and seek their own destruction. They see evil in themselves and desire to destroy it. The centralizers desire this, as it breaks down society into an easier distribution from which they can further grab more power and reach their inevitable goals. This means the inevitable degradation is actually an innate incentive of the rule-by-many forms. In the rule-by-few and rule-by-one forms, the incentive is the opposite. The centralizers already control the nation; they have a desire to preserve it for the sake of their own power. They do not want the people or culture to change in too extreme a fashion, as it would then be harder for them to maintain power. This differing of incentives is what leads the degenerative rule-by-many form to be even more dangerous than the degenerative variants of the centralized forms when considering a long-term outlook.

For many, a transition into a newly centralized form is a welcome relief from the continuation of the degeneracy of the prior form. This is how anacyclosis happens: the population realizes there is no way to fix the endemic problems brought about by centralization, so they endorse even more centralization to escape it. They realize that the current degeneracy is worse than anything else that could come after it.

It is my opinion that the rule-by-many variant is the deadliest strain; it has the potential to completely obliterate even the strongest of nations if not rectified rapidly. But, ironically, it is also the strain with the most chance of providing a beneficial accountability environment for its citizens (at least during the positive stages). It is a powerful tool that can be used for great good or great evil. We must use pieces of this form to build our own, but with much diligence.

Prior to moving forward, it is necessary to recognize that the legacy frameworks do not always collapse by accident. Many times, they are instituted this way by design, because the rulers know the new framework will be prone to centralization, or will otherwise be of personal benefit to them. These rulers often implement a particular framework for the appeasement of the masses, knowing full well the weaknesses inherent within that framework. They use these weaknesses to exploit the system for their continual advantage, even after transition. This is one of the many reasons why the frameworks keep repeating throughout history—Because the rulers recognize this trend, while those whom they consider peasants do not.

The conclusion I hope our reader takes from this chapter is that the cycle exists and is affecting their personal life right now. Our nation’s point on the circle never stops moving. Sometimes we fight back the progression for a few extra years. Sometimes, even decades. Yet, we have never found a way to fully stop it. The cycle continues on. Endlessly. We know exactly why this happens, but we are powerless to stop it given the intrinsic conditions of the legacy forms.

The reason most people have not heard nor understand these obvious truths is because those in power have a vested incentive in the regular citizens not knowing them. For if we truly understand it, we would all want to resist it. My hope is that the reader recognizes the crucial issue that we face: either we support frameworks that have failed and continue to fail, or we build our own. This will not be a straightforward task, nor will this book have all the answers. But the attempt to break us free of our chains must begin somewhere, and we strive to do so here.

[i] Plato, The Republic, Book 8.

[ii] Polybius, The Histories, Fragment of Book VI.

[iii] Aristotle is similar to the others, but had a few minor differences in how he believed the cycle progressed. He believed the cycle begins with monarchy and ends in anarchy, which is outlined in his book Politics. Because of the similarities, we do not dive into his view as in-depth as the others, as it would mostly be repetition. However, two things of interest are that Aristotle considers constitutional democracy as the degenerate form of the rule-by-many, and he believed even minor changes to the state must be opposed because they will eventually add up to complete transformations, given enough time. Aristotle also advocated for blending the three frameworks into one. We agree with all three positions.

[iv] Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses On Livy, 1469-1527.

[v] Sir John Glubb, The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival. A short but very worthwhile read.

[vi] Polybius, The Histories, Fragment of Book VI, 235.

[vii] Paul Grendler. Francesco Sansovino and Italian Popular History 1560-1600. Studies in the Renaissance Vol. 16 (1969), pp. 139-180.

[viii] John Adams. Defence of the Constitutions: Vol. 1, Letter XXXI. Ancient Republics, And Opinions of Philosophers.

[ix] George Washington. “Transcript of President George Washington’s Farewell Address” (1796).

[x] Quite the opposite. In the modern day, we even permit dual citizens of foreign countries to hold political office.

[xi] Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De republica. Project Gutenberg. Quotes are from XXIX, XXVIII, and XLII in that order.

[xii] Baron de Montesquieu. Complete Works, Vol 1. The Spirit of The Laws. Book 8, Chapter 2.

[xiii] Julius Evola. Revolt Against the Modern World. Chapter 9, Life and Death of Civilizations. Page 55-56, 59.

[xiv] Ibid., Chapter 35, The Regression of the Castes. Page 327-329. The entire book is worth a read for those interested in the cycle of civilizational collapse.

[xv] Giambattista Vico. The New Science. 1725.

[xvi] Niccolò Machiavelli, History of Florence, Book V, Chapter 1.

[xvii] Research appears to indicate that the actual “Hard times…” quote comes from G. Michael Hopf in his work “Those Who Remain”. However, the underlying idea has been around much longer.

[xviii] Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses On Livy, Chapter XLIX.

[xix] Ryszard Legutko. The Demon in Democracy: Totalitarian Temptations in Free Societies. Page 55-56.

[xx] Sir John Glubb, The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival. Page 24.

[xxi] Ibid., Page 23.

[xxii] Henning Webb Prentis. Bulwarks of Freedom. Page 11. The shorter and more common version is: “From bondage to spiritual faith; from spiritual faith to courage; from courage to liberty; from liberty to abundance, from abundance to selfishness; from selfishness to apathy; from apathy to dependency; and from dependency back to bondage once more”.

[xxiii] Christianity has numerous cycles, not just the resurrection. Christianity also presents a degeneration theory, although it would be a linear variant, rather than a cyclical one. I call this the “continual degeneration theory”. We see it in numerous Christian topics, such as original sin and the Fall of Man to a continually more degenerate condition, but the most obvious is in lifespans. The original Patriarchs lived for nearly a thousand years (Adam lived to be 930, Noah to 950). The post-Noah descendants were far shorter, in accordance with continual degeneration (Shem lived only 600 years, Terah 205, Abraham only 175). Finishing with the apostles, this led to lifespans of only approximately 90 years of age. This theory is in accordance with the human life span declining to a hundred and twenty years, as stated in Genesis 6:3. But this theory also represents a similar continual degeneration of mankind, akin to the Kali Yuga in Hinduism.

[xxiv] The two works are: “Secular Cycles” by Peter Turchin and Sergey A. Nefedov, Princeton University Press 2009 and “War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires” by Peter Turchin, Plume 2007.

[xxv] Another very useful work from Tocqueville is The Old Regime and the Revolution. Both are highly recommended. Both works bring up two important takeaways. The first is the problem of the blind quest for absolute equality inherent in the rule-by-many forms. The second is the Tocqueville effect where social frustration increases as social conditions improve. Both are necessary problems to rectify for any sustainable framework.

[xxvi] Three good places to start would be with the cyclical writings by Ibn Khaldun, Biohistory by Jim Penman, or the Strauss-Howe generational theory.

[xxvii] Occasionally, we use the terms “late-stage” or “degenerative” when discussing a system or framework, as well. These are mostly synonymous with “negative-stage”. The only pedantic difference would be that “late-stage” indicates an even more degenerative condition than the initial period of a negative-stage regime.

[xxviii] The libertarian fallacy stems from a fundamentally incorrect system worldview, where everything is measured on a scale of “liberty” to “tyranny”. This is incorrect for numerous reasons, but the most pressing for our research is that the entity being measured is always solely the state, never the full societal arenas. But “tyranny” (in a libertarian context) can, and does, occur in all the arenas just as easily as the political arena. “Tyranny” is also prevalent in every system through their negative (degenerative) framework; it is not relegated to only the centralized variants.

[xxix] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics. The book discusses how leaders will usually do whatever is necessary to remain in power, regardless of national or communal interest. This is why a truly good politician must either be forced to be compliant with the national interest or the national interest must be their own interest.

[xxx] Bad economics definitely contributes to an increasingly faster collapse. But fiscal policy did not start the fall. Most of the libertarian types preferred the fiscal environment of the early Americas. What changed to allow the economic environment to change?

[xxxi] Bad politics definitely leads to ridiculous laws and hilarious absurdities during a decline, but it does nothing to begin the process. Why were the leaders once decent, but now they are bad? What actually changed?

[xxxii] Biological changes in a population are immensely harmful, especially when they stem from massive immigration. In many cases, it is the death knell for civilizations. But it does not start the fall. Something else changes that weakens the homogeneous nation to allow immigrants in the first place. What is it?

[xxxiii] Morality is downstream of the prevailing soul of a people. It can only reflect what the people allow it to reflect. So, what changed in the people to alter their cultural reflection?

[xxxiv] This occurred after one particularly bad king in Roman history—Tarquinius—inspired a revolution against his reign. The Roman Kingdom perfectly demonstrates the concept of a poor rule-by-one leader bringing about the anacyclosis transition to a rule-by-many.

[xxxv] This concept is applicable to historical periods, as well. For instance, the classical era “democracy” systems would not be what a modern reader would think of as democracy, but so long as it holds the rule-by-many definition of component decentralization, it would still be of the rule-by-many framework.

[xxxvi] Sir John Glubb, The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival. Page 15. Relevant text: “The historians commented bitterly on the extraordinary influence acquired by popular singers over young people, resulting in a decline in sexual morality. The ‘pop’ singers of Baghdad accompanied their erotic songs on the lute, an instrument resembling the modern guitar. In the second half of the tenth century, as a result, much obscene sexual language came increasingly into use, such as would not have been tolerated in an earlier age. Several khalifs issued orders banning ‘pop’ singers from the capital, but within a few years they always returned.”

[xxxvii] Ibid., Page 14. Relevant text: “In Baghdad, in the golden days of Harun al-Rashid, Arabs were a minority in the imperial capital. Istanbul, in the great days of Ottoman rule, was peopled by inhabitants remarkably few of whom were descendants of Turkish conquerors. In New York, descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers are few and far between. This interesting phenomenon is largely limited to great cities. The original conquering race is often to be found in relative purity in rural districts and on far frontiers. It is the wealth of the great cities which draws the immigrants. As, with the growth of industry, cities nowadays achieve an ever-greater preponderance over the countryside, so will the influence of foreigners increasingly dominate old empires.”

[xxxviii] Similar logic applies to those who view political systems through an elementary “liberty” versus “tyranny” lens, where the world is supposedly getting “freer” over time.

[xxxix] A good example of this true pendulum, in the context of political policies that are confined within the modern-day zone, is voting in the United States. Our generation argues about voting identification cards. The conservatives favor them; the progressives disdain them. Even if the conservatives win this particular battle, the country would not exhibit a return to tradition (a “swing to the right”). This political topic is nowhere near the traditional voting position in the United States where only about 5-10% of the voting population were even able to vote (white, male, landowner, et cetera). There is no pendulum that is even remotely swinging in the direction of this traditional position. That is because that zone has long since passed and is not even up for consideration anymore.

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